



RENAISSANCE

OR ILLUSION ?



TOURNONS LA PAGE
Pour l'alternance démocratique
en Afrique



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Pour l'alternance démocratique
en Afrique

18 MONTHS OF TRANSITION IN GABON

Citizen observation report
- APRIL 2025 -

ABRÉVIATIONS

ACET	Alliance Citoyenne
AfDB	African Development Bank
BCEG	Banque pour le Commerce et l'Entre- prenariat du Gabon
NCC	National Constitutional Committee
CECA-GADIS	Compagnie d'Exploitation Commerciale d'Afrique, Gabonaise de Distribution
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
COBAC	Central African Banking Commission
CPPF	Caisse des Pensions et des Prestations Familiales
CTRI	Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions
DNI	Dialogue National Inclusif
FDS	Defence and Security Forces
FIMO	Association of Unwed Mothers of Moyen-Ogooué
IMF	International Monetary Fund
GOC	Gabon Oil Company
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
NSR	New Remuneration System
OMVJ	Organisation for the Development of Youth
CEO	Gabonese Democratic Party (Bongo Family Party)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
PNDT	National Development Plan for the Transition
REDHAC	Network of Human Rights Defenders in Central Africa
ReFLeT	Woman Rise Up Network
ROLBG	Network of Free Organizations for Good Governance
SMIG	Guaranteed Interprofessional Minimum Wage
TLP	Let's Turn the Page
TLP-Gabon	Tournons La Page Coalition in Gabon
UCET	Study and Works Coordination Unit

PRESENTATION OF
TOURNONS LA PAGE

Tournons La Page (TLP) is an international move-
ment, bringing together more than 250 African
and European civil society organizations whose
objective is to promote democratic alternation and
good governance. Created in 2014, Tournons La
Page now brings together 15 national and regional
coalitions.

Created in 2015, the Tournons La Page coalition
in Gabon brings together civil society organi-
zations that advocate for the promotion of citi-
zen participation, civic engagement, transpar-
ency and democracy in the country. Thus, the
following actively participated in the drafting
of the report: Dynamique OSCAF Gabon, NGO
ALSEM, Network of Free Organizations for Good
Governance (ROLBG), Réseau Femmes Lève-Toi
(ReFLeT), Network of Human Rights Defenders
in Central Africa (REDHAC), Organization for the
Development of Youth (OMVJ), Gabonese from
Nowhere, Association manger frais/BIO FOOD and
the Association of Daughter-Mothers of Moyen-
Ogooué (FIMO).

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY -----	4	JUSTICE -----	30
METHODOLOGY -----	4	Situational analysis -----	30
CONTEXT -----	5	Effective measures -----	30
POLITICAL GOVERNANCE -----	8	Examination and Observations on My Effective Measures -----	30
Effective measures -----	8	Assessment of Justice in Transition -----	33
Review and Observations of CTRI Policy Measures -----	9	HUMAN RIGHTS -----	34
Review and observations on effective measures of political governance. -----	9	Situational analysis -----	34
Assessment of Political Governance in Transition -----	16	Effective measures -----	34
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE -----	17	Reviews and Observations -----	34
Situational analysis -----	17	Review of the Human Rights Situation in Transition -----	39
Effective measures -----	17	CONCLUSION -----	40
Review and comments on effective measures -----	18	RECOMMENDATIONS -----	41
Assessment of Economic Governance in Transition -----	28	To the President of the Transition -----	41
		To the Gabonese Justice -----	41
		To the next Gabonese government -----	42



SUMMARY

Since the change of power of control of institutions by the military led by Brigadier General Brice Clotaire OLIGUI NGUEMA, the new Gabonese authorities have announced their intention to fight corruption and improve governance. The event was greeted with scenes of popular jubilation, after 56 years of governance by the Bongo family.

As soon as they arrived, the members of the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions (CTRI) put forward several reforms aimed at reviving the economy, strengthening social justice and reforming Gabonese institutions.

Among the main announcements are the recovery of embezzled public funds, the renovation of infrastructure, the reduction of the cost of living and the review of the functioning of all institutions, starting with the Constitutional Court.

However, despite the change announced and the many projects and salutary socio-economic measures undertaken by the transitional authorities, concerns remain about the real desire for rupture expected and hoped for by the population. In addition, certain political practices seem to call into question the desire for a real change of government after the return to constitutional order.

METHODOLOGY

This report entitled “Renaissance or Illusion? 18 months of Transition in Gabon” is the result of a collaborative effort between the international secretariat of Tournons La Page (TLP) and the Tournons La Page coalition in Gabon (TLP-Gabon). Thanks to its members, TLP-Gabon has collected information, testimonies, interviews, articles, statements and images following up on the promises made by the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions (CTRI) since the coup d’état of August 30, 2023.

This non-exhaustive report aims to present a qualitative analysis of the actions and events of the Transition, based on formal and solemn decisions or commitments made by the members of the CTRI following four main themes:

- **Political governance**
- **Economic governance**
- **Justice**
- **Human rights**



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CONTEXTE

THE GABONESE REPUBLIC IN A FEW FIGURES AND DATA¹ :

- **Capital** : Libreville
- **Area** : 267 677 km²
- **3 border countries** : Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea
- **Population** : 2,485,000 inhabitants
- **Religion: Christianity** (83% of the population)
- **Median age** : 23 years²
- **Gabon’s economy** is mainly centered on oil exploitation, mining and the timber industry.
- **34.3%** of the population lives below the poverty line.³

Gabon, one of the least densely populated countries in Africa, is endowed with many mineral resources such as oil, uranium, phosphates, man-

1. Gabon, Global Data < <https://www.donneesmondiales.com/afrique/gabon/index.php> >
2. Median age of the population in Gabon from 1950 to 2050. Statista. < <https://fr.statista.com/statistiques/786455/age-median-de-la-population-gabon/#:-:text=En%202015%2C%20l%27%C3%A2ge%20m%C3%A9dian,%C3%A9tait%20d%27environ%2023%20ans.>> >
3. The World Bank in Gabon. World Bank Group. < <https://www.banquemonnaie.org/fr/country/gabon/overview#2> >



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ganese, diamonds, zinc, marble, niobium and precious wood. There are mainly about forty Bantu ethnic groups that populate Gabon. The Fang are the largest ethnic group from a numerical point of view and make up about 30.9% of the population⁴.

After waves of Portuguese, Dutch and then French colonization, Gabon obtained its independence on August 17, 1960. Léon MBA, president of the Governing Council of Gabon under colonization, became the country’s first president. While it is considered one of the most politically stable African countries, Gabon was shaken by a coup d’état on the night of February 17 to 18, 1964 where 150 soldiers arrested the president and the president of the National Assembly and set up a provisional government.

The next day, French paratroopers stormed the military camp where Léon MBA was imprisoned and managed to free him and give him back power. The reinstalled president then led a major campaign of repression against his political opponents, arresting dozens of them. Léon MBA, secluded in his presidential palace and protected by French soldiers, died three years later of cancer, on November 28, 1967 in Paris. He was then replaced by his chief of staff Albert-Bernard BONGO, who would later be called Omar BONGO ONDIMBA.

The latter established a one-party system with the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG), which he founded in 1968. In the first presidential election he organised in 1973, he was the only candidate and won the election with 99.6% of the vote. Still the sole candidate, he was re-elected in 1979 and 1986 with 99.8% and 100% of the vote respectively.

In 1973, the oil crisis offered a decade of prosperity during which a major infrastructure policy was carried out, with the international media even speaking of the “Gabonese miracle”.⁵ But at the end of the 1980s, the fall in the price of oil plunged Gabon into a serious economic crisis,

4. The Gabonese Legal System and Legal Research”, Ernest Folefack, updated by Alexis ESSONO OVONO and NZE-MEZUIE Steevens. Hauser Global Law School Program. Published in May 2019. <<https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Gabon1.html#:~:text=La%20l%C3%A9gislation%20nationale%20>>
5 “Gabon, an emerging country”, Christian Gambotti. Published in 2014. <<https://www.cairn.info/revue-geoeconomie-2014-1-page-159.htm>>

leading the population to multiply political and social demands. A national conference was then organised in March-April 1990, following which major reforms were implemented, including the opening up of a multiparty system. Despite this, Omar Bongo Odirba was still re-elected president in 1993, 1998 and 2005 with 51%, 66% and 79.2% of the votes respectively in elections still contested by the opposition.

In 2009, Omar Bongo Odimba died of cancer while hospitalized in Barcelona and it was his son, Ali Bongo Odimba, then Minister of Defense, who took over the country after a highly contested election, which gave rise to riots that were violently repressed by the police, leaving about fifteen people dead according to the opposition⁶. The African Union's election observation mission highlighted "irregularities" and "weaknesses" in the conduct of the election⁷. The American ambassador Charles Rivkin even wrote in a telegram that "in October 2009, Ali Bongo reversed the vote count and declared himself president".⁸

Ali BONGO ONDIMBA is running for re-election in the 2016 presidential election, during which riots broke out after the announcement of his victory while the government refused to publish the results by polling station. The police violently dispersed the demonstrations and attacked the headquarters of the main opponent, Jean PING, killing at least 2 people⁹.

In February 2017, a European Union resolution considered that "the official results of the presidential election lack transparency and are extremely dubious".¹⁰

6. "The riots in Port-Gentil would have caused several dozen deaths according to an opposition figure", Le Monde. 09/09/2009. <https://www.lemonde.fr/asi-pacifique/article/2009/09/09/les-emeutes-de-port-gentil-auraient-fait-plusieurs-dizaines-de-morts-selon-une-figure-de-l-opposition_1237851_3216.html>
7. "Paris relatively satisfied with the election in Gabon, the 'Françafrique' pointed out", Jeune Afrique. 04/09/2009. <<https://www.jeuneafrique.com/158332/archives-thematique/paris-relativement-satisfait-de-l-lection-au-gabon-la-fran-afrique-point-e-du-doigt/>>
8. In Gabon, the mechanics of nepotism are coming to a halt", Le Monde Diplomatique. Published in October 2016. <<https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2016/10/PIOT/56406>>
9. "Gabon: five dead in clashes, opponents detained at Jean Ping's HQ allowed to return home", Jeune Afrique. Published on 02/09/2016. <<https://www.jeuneafrique.com/353923/politique/gabon-cinq-morts-26-opposants-toujours-retenus-qg-de-jean-ping/>>
10. European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2017 on the rule of law crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Gabon, European Parliament. Published

The post-electoral political crisis will be exacerbated following the cardiovascular accident of Ali Bongo Ondimba on October 24, 2018 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia¹¹. It will then be accentuated again with the activation of the state of emergency regime, triggered on April 10, 2020 to fight the Covid-19 health crisis.

On July 9, 2023, President Ali BONGO ONDIMBA announced his candidacy for a third term in the presidential election of August 26, 2023¹². At the end of the election, Ali BONGO ODIMBA was announced as the winner, his victory was immediately followed by a military coup d'état on the night of August 29 to 30, 2023.

Indeed, three days after the presidential election was held, Ali Bongo Ondimba was overthrown by Brigadier General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema. This event caused a shockwave at the national and international level because the country was known for its "stability" and the undivided reign of the BONGO dynasty in power since 1967, i.e. for more than 56 years. However, at the moment when the first international sanctions fall, a debate opens up on the real motivations of a coup that is as unlikely as it is unpredictable. Indeed, very soon after the overthrow of power, the population, indignant and frustrated by the announcement of yet another fraudulent "victory" of Ali Bongo Ondimba (while most of the provisional results compiled in the polling stations gave Albert Ondo Ossa, candidate of the main opposition coalition, the clear victory), welcomed the coup d'état. While everyone feared a bloody repression the day after the proclamation of Ali Bongo Ondimba's victory, like the previous election in 2016 when several dozen people would have lost their lives¹³, it is rather scenes of jubilation and celebration by the army.

However, managing the post-coup period through a political transition remains a major challenge to get the country out of the democratic impasse, as the future is now determined in a dilemma between a strongman and strong institutions.

on 02/02/2017. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0017_FR.html>
11. "Headlines: Ali Bongo victim of a stroke", Rfi. Published on 08/11/2018. <<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/emission/20181108-une-ali-bongo-victime-avc>>
12. "Gabon: Ali Bongo announces his candidacy for the presidential election for a 3rd term", France 24. Published on 09/07/2023. <<https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20230709-gabon-ali-bongo-annonce-sa-candidature-%C3%A0-l-%C3%A9lection-pr%C3%A9sidentielle-pour-un-3e-mandat>>
13. "The families of victims of the 2016 violence still demand justice", VOA, Published on 26/01/2019. <<https://www.voafrique.com/a/les-familles-de-victimes-des-violences-de-2016-r%C3%A9clament-toujours-justice/4760039.html>>

Thus, after dissolving all institutions and setting up the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions (CTRI), Gabon officially entered the Transition period on September 4, 2024, with the swearing-in of Brigadier General Brice Clotaire OLIGUI NGUEMA.

The present report therefore aims to take stock of the first 18 months of a Transition officially planned for a period of two years. It is based on

effective measures taken by the CTRI to establish a qualitative assessment of the Transition process underway in Gabon with a concern for objectivity, neutrality and impartiality.

To this end, the examination and non-exhaustive observations of the various effective measures mentioned in this report are not intended to stir up controversy but rather to open up prospects for an improvement of the Transition process.

Source : [lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr)



POLITICAL GOVERNANCE

The military coup of August 30, 2023 appears to be the unlikely epilogue of a cycle of particularly violent electoral conflicts that began with the election, or rather the “electoral succession” of Ali BONGO ONDIMBA to his father Omar BONGO ONDIMBA in 2009. It should be remembered that since 1967, the Bongo dynasty has reigned continuously over Gabon for 56 years. On the political level, the longevity of the BONGO system can be explained by a mixture of nepotism, clientelism and tribal geopolitics, all orchestrated by the impoverishment of the masses against a backdrop of systematic embezzlement of public funds.

In such a context, the Bongo-PDG (Gabonese Democratic Party) system relied on the politicization of the administration and the corruption of the elites to lock in elections and manipulate the political class. Thus, when they took power, the military justified their intervention as a patriotic act aimed at putting an end to the rigging of elections, bad governance and the bankruptcy of the institutions of the Bongo-PDG political system that have plunged the country into a situation of generalized crisis and underdevelopment.

EFFECTIVE MEASURES

As soon as the coup d’état was announced, described as a “liberation coup” by its perpetrators, the military organized around Brigadier General Brice Clotaire OLIGUI NGUEMA took the following measures¹⁴:

- A. Cancellation of the general elections and the dissolution of all institutions - August 30, 2023;
- B. Establishment of the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions (CTRI) - August 30, 2023;
- C. Consultation of all the nation’s living forces (political class, clergy, civil society and the press) - from August 31 to September 3, 2023;
- D. Publication of a Transition Charter largely inspired by the 1991 Constitution resulting from the national conference that introduced the country into a multiparty system - 4 September 2023 (Cf. Annex 1);

14. “All the communiqués of the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of the Institutions of Gabon”, CTRI. Accessed 06/01/2025. <<https://ctrigabon.com/communiqués>>



Source : [courrierinternational.com](https://www.courrierinternational.com)

- E. Swearing-in of the President of the Transition - September 4, 2023;
- F. Announcement of the timetable of the Transition planned for a period of two years - November 13, 2023;
- G. Appointment of a Prime Minister and a Transitional Government - 07 and September 2023;
- H. Establishment of the National Assembly and the Senate of the Transition - September 11, 2023;
- I. Call for contributions for the preparation and organization of the Inclusive National Dialogue (DNI) - October 2023 and March 2024;
- J. Launch of the Republican Tour of the President of the Transition - Between December 2023 and August 2024;
- K. Establishment of a constitutional committee and organization of a constitutional referendum - May 7 and November 16, 2024;
- L. Adoption of a new constitution and the new electoral code - 29 November 2024 and 22 January 2025.

REVIEW AND OBSERVATIONS OF CTRI POLICY MEASURES

In general, most of the measures presented above aim to guarantee a peaceful and politically inclusive Transition in order to promote the advent of genuine democratic governance after 56 years of dictatorship of the Bongo-PDG system.

However, an analytical examination of these measures is necessary to make an assessment of the Transition process underway in Gabon. Thus, on the basis of the decisions taken during these first 18 months of Transition, the following assessments and observations can be made.

REVIEW AND OBSERVATIONS ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES OF POLITICAL GOVERNANCE.

The examination and observations made on the effective measures taken during this year of Transition make it possible to assess the relevance and limits in terms of political governance:

A- Cancellation of the general elections and the dissolution of all institutions.

The first strong announcement of the CTRI, made in communiqué No. 001 of August 30, 2023, was widely welcomed by populations exasperated by years of bad governance under the ousted Bongo-PDG regime, accused of having emptied institutions of their sovereign essence. This declaration symbolizes a clear desire for rupture and change, thus fueling the hopes placed in the political transition process.

The cancellation of the general elections of August 26, 2023 has made it possible to avoid a bloody repression of popular protests. These elections, organized in chaotic conditions according to the opposition, saw the proclamation of the victory of Ali BONGO ONDIMBA with 64.27% of the ¹⁵votes, in a climate marked by suspicions of fraud¹⁶. The day after the vote, the government cut off internet

15. “Gabon: Ali Bongo re-elected president with 64.27% of the vote,” France 24. Published on 30/08/2023. <https://www.france24.com/fr/info-en-continu/20230830-gabon-alibongo-r%C3%A9lu-pr%C3%A9sident-avec-64-27-des-voix-r%C3%A9sultats-officiel>
16. “Presidential election in Gabon: Internet cut off and curfew introduced after fraud denounced by the opposition”, Le Monde. Published on 26/08/2023. <https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/08/26/presidentielle-au-gabon-internet-coupe-et-couvre-feu-instaure-apres-les-fraudes-denoncees-par-l-opposition_6186670_3212.html>

access and introduced a curfew, reinforcing popular mistrust.

Occurring in the wake of the official proclamation of the results, the seizure of power by the Defence and Security Forces (FDS) created a surprise effect and raised many questions about its appropriateness. Was this intervention aimed at breaking a cycle that has become sadly usual – manipulation of electoral results, protests, repression and negotiations? Or was it seeking to re-establish the truth of the ballot box by recognising the presumed victory of Albert ONDO OSSA, the sole candidate of the opposition?

The cancellation of the general elections, although having made it possible to avoid yet another post-electoral crisis, has fuelled some misunderstandings about the real intentions of the military. Similarly, the dissolution of institutions, a common practice during coups d’état, could be justified by the advanced state of decay of the latter. However, for some, it could also appear as an “alibi” aimed at legitimising the cancellation of the elections.

B- Establishment of the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions (CTRI)

This act made it possible to restore a certain trust between the Army and the people, in a context where the SDF had until then been mainly perceived as an instrument of repression rather than liberation. By intervening on the night of August 29 to 30, 2023, the CTRI, mainly composed of soldiers, has imposed itself as an interposition force, thus preventing Gabon from sinking into a new bloody electoral contestation.

It should also be noted that the coup was carried out without any bloodshed, which strengthened popular support for the seizure of power, at least initially.

However, if the decision to concentrate power in the hands of the CTRI was justified in the immediacy of the crisis to federate all the FDS and stabilize the situation, its coexistence with the other institutions of the Transition could quickly become problematic. Indeed, the CTRI appears as a hybrid entity, both political and military, which raises questions about the distribution of prerogatives between the different structures of the Transition.

This double hat could also weaken its legitimacy if institutional abuses or conflicts of competence were to emerge. In addition, the neutrality of the CTRI could be seriously questioned in the event of a candidacy of the President of the Transition



Source : ali24news.com

in future elections, further blurring the boundary between his military and political responsibilities.

To avoid these pitfalls, it is imperative that the CTRI clarifies its role and intentions, with a strong commitment to preserving the balance of power and ensuring a truly inclusive and democratic Transition. Any ambiguity in his position could fuel a climate of mistrust, risking compromising hopes for change among the population in this pivotal period in Gabonese history

C- Consultation of all the nation's vital forces

This measure illustrates the willingness of the new military authorities to establish inclusiveness by taking into account the frustrations, participation, and aspirations of citizens. It aims to lay the foundations for a peaceful democratic transition, likely to restore trust between the State and the population.

While this initiative was initially hailed as a gesture of openness and dialogue, a closer look suggests a subtle use of political strategy. Indeed, it could have served to defuse any challenge to the CTRI, by channeling criticism and integrating it into a controlled framework.

Moreover, some of the decisions taken following these consultations are now raising questions about the sincerity of the exchanges and the fidelity to the initial commitments. Several fringes of civil society and political actors denounce procedural abuses in the management of the Transition, pointing in particular to:

- **A lack of transparency in the follow-up of the recommendations** resulting from the consultations;
- Appointments perceived as partisan or motivated by considerations other than the general interest;

- An excessive concentration of power in the hands of the CTRI, to the detriment of the promises of participatory governance.

These concerns are fuelling a climate of growing mistrust, in a context where popular expectations remain high. Citizens, as well as political and social actors, hoped that this Transition would mark a clear break with the practices of the old regime, but some now fear a simple recycling of the methods of the past under a new institutional façade.

D- Drafting of a Transition Charter (Cf. Appendix 1)

Inspired by the Constitution of 26 March 1991, the Charter sets the foundations of the political transition process, while specifying the mechanisms and the role of the institutional actors responsible for its implementation. It also fills the institutional vacuum created by the dissolution of the old institutions, thus constituting a first step towards a return to constitutional order.

Nevertheless, the conditions for its elaboration, particularly in terms of time and the identity of its drafters, remain relatively obscure to this day, fuelling questions about its fairness.

In addition, some specific provisions raise questions about its democratic nature, including:

- The prohibition of all members of the Transition's institutions from standing as candidates in future elections, with the notable exception of the President of the Transition, which could be perceived as an asymmetry of treatment that is difficult to justify; it should be noted that this provision has been reviewed in the new Electoral Code adopted in January 2025. The latter gives the possibility to magistrates and soldiers to stand for election under certain conditions.
- The immunity granted by Article 59 of this Charter to the members of the CTRI, covering the period from the coup d'état to the inauguration of the President of the Transition, raises concerns. In the event of abuses or abuses of power, this provision could complicate accountability and hinder the quest for justice, thus weakening popular confidence in the institutions of the Transition.

E- Swearing-in of the President of the Transition

This widely publicized event marked the end of the Bongo regime and officially highlighted Brigadier

General Brice Clotaire OLIGUI NGUEMA, until then a very discreet character and little known to the general public.

Brice Clotaire OLIGUI NGUEMA was born on March 3, 1975 in Ngouoni in the south-east of Gabon. His father, a teacher by profession, belongs to the Fang ethnic group in the province of Woleu-Ntem, while his mother is from the Teke ethnic group, originally from the department of Lékon-Lékori, in the province of Haut-Ogooué. Through his mother, he is related to the BONGO family, the latter being a cousin of the mother of former president Omar BONGO ONDIMBA.

OLIGUI NGUEMA underwent military training at the Royal Military Academy in Meknes, Morocco, where he acquired skills that would mark his career in the army. Under the presidency of Omar Bongo Ondimba, he served as an aide-de-camp, a strategic position that brought him closer to the center of power.

After the death of Omar Bongo Ondimba in 2009 and the accession to power of his son Ali Bongo Ondimba, Brice Oligui Nguema was removed from his central functions and appointed military attaché, first at the Gabonese embassy in Morocco, then at the Senegalese embassy, distancing him from influential circles of power.

In October 2019, he was recalled to Gabon and succeeded Colonel Frédéric BONGO, half-brother of Ali BONGO ONDIMBA, as head of the General Directorate of Special Services (DGSS), a key intelligence branch within the Republican Guard. The main mission of this structure is to ensure the protection of the President of the Republic, both on national territory and abroad.

On 8 April 2020, then a colonel, he was appointed Commander of the Defence and Security Corps of the Republican Guard, succeeding General Grégoire KOUNA. This position strengthened his influence within the armed forces, particularly within the Republican Guard, considered the backbone of the regime.

Now, Brice OLIGUI NGUEMA, once a key member of the Bongo regime, becomes the de facto head of state. The inauguration speech ([see Appendix 2](#)) imbued with patriotism galvanized the support of the active forces around the Transition process. Through this colorful and symbolic ceremony to which all the political and diplomatic elite were invited, Gabon solemnly entered the era of Transition.

F- Announcement of the Transition timetable

On 13 November 2023, the CTRI announced a Transition timetable in 19 periods ([see Appendix 3](#)) which extends until August 2025. As the Transition is an exceptional period, this long-awaited decision, which aims at a return to constitutional order, has helped to alleviate the frustrations of a part of the opposition convinced that it has once again been robbed of a victory in the election. Secondly, it made it possible to reassure the financial partners and international organizations that had condemned the coup d'état and imposed sanctions against Gabon.

While the timetable seemed to be followed without major delays, on January 23, 2025, to everyone's surprise, the government spokesman announced that the presidential elections would be held on April 12, 2025, four months before the initially scheduled deadline¹⁷.

G- Appointment of a Prime Minister and a Transitional Government

On September 7, 2023, Raymond NDONG SIMA, an opposition figure since 2015 (previously at the PDG) with a profile of economist and technocrat, already Prime Minister under Ali BONGO ONDIMBA between 2012 and 2014, was appointed to the position of Prime Minister of the Transition. He is known for his rigor and seriousness in the management of public affairs. This is enough to reassure technical and financial partners about the many challenges of the perilous recovery of the Gabonese economy. He advocates a two-year Transition at the end of which the military would not be able to stand for election¹⁸.

On September 11, 2023, he announced the appointment of a Transitional government in which the military, members of the opposition, the diaspora, civil society and the former ruling party appeared, reflecting a desire for inclusiveness of the CTRI and to a lesser extent a call for unity, a cardinal value for the success of the Transition process. This government is welcomed by the population to meet the many needs and expectations in terms of improving living conditions and access to basic social infrastructure (roads, schools, hos-

17. "In Gabon, the presidential election is set for April 12", Le Monde. Published on 23/01/2025. <https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/01/23/au-gabon-l-election-presidentielle-est-fixee-au-12-avril_6511439_3212.html>

18. "Raymond Ndong Sima appointed Transitional Prime Minister in Gabon", TV5 Monde. Published on 07/09/2023. <<https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/video/raymond-ndong-sima-nomme-premier-ministre-de-Transition-au-gabon-2666922>>

pitals, access to water and employment, etc.). It should be noted that this type of initiative should be the responsibility of a legitimately elected government, a Transitional government should devote itself to socio-economic emergencies and especially to the success of the Transition without engaging in medium or long-term development projects that involve the solicitation and disbursement of funds from donors.

Label	Number of members	Former ruling majority	Military	Former opposition in power	Social representatives
Mali	25	00 (00%)	04 (16%)	04 (16%)	17 (68%)
Chad	40	31 (77%)	03 (08%)	04 (10%)	02 (05%)
Guinea	27	05 (19%)	02 (07%)	07 (26%)	13 (48%)
Burkina Faso	23		03 (13%)		20 (87%)
Niger	26	01 (04%)	02 (08%)	02 (08%)	21 (80%)
Gabon	26	14 (53%)	03 (12%)	03 (12%)	06 (23%)

Table 1 – Table of Governments in Transition¹⁹

As the table above shows, the very large number of personalities of the deposed regime (53%) as well as the low representativeness of civil society (23%) and even the military (12%) seem to call into question the desire for rupture advocated by the CTRI. Obviously, the predominance of political personalities (opposition and former ruling party combined), i.e. 65%, may suggest a form of continuity logic with possibly great risks of manipulation and political calculations in future elections. Even today, part of the public expresses reservations about the success of the Transition by relying on this too strong presence of members of the deposed regime in the organs.

In addition, in an interview with the magazine Jeune Afrique on May 10, 2024, the ousted former president Ali BONGO ONDIMBA ironically on this point by clearly challenging the CTRI to do better than him “with collaborators he knows well and with whom he has worked for a long time”.²⁰

19. Table taken from the press conference of March 01, 2024. Transition in Gabon: Observations and perspectives after 6 months? From the Old Order to the New Order, Rebalance THE ADJUSTMENT SCREW. <<https://droit-et-politique-en-afrique.info/6-mois-de-transition-au-gabon-observations-et-perspectives>>
20. “Exclusive: meeting with Ali Bongo Ondimba, in Libreville”, Jeune Afrique. Published on 27/05/2024. <<https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1571810/politique/exclusif-rencontre-avec-ali-bongo-ondimba-a-libreville/>>

H- Establishment of the National Assembly and the Transitional Senate

On October 30, 2023, the work of the Transitional Parliaments will begin. This announced decision of the CTRI aims to materialize the commitment of all the living forces of the nation in the Transition process. The choice of personalities from civil society and the opposition in the offices of these institu-

tions is therefore part of this logic of inclusiveness and cohesion advocated by the CTRI. Moreover, the presence of at least three representatives of minorities (indigenous peoples) in each of these institutions marks a turning point in Gabon’s political history.

These institutions, like the government, suffer from a problem of equity and balance in the representativeness between members of civil society, the military and the political actors who are in the majority. This state of affairs could raise doubts about the credibility of these institutions, especially when it comes to making delicate decisions on certain controversial subjects such as the accountability of the previous regime.

Table 2. Comparative table of the representativeness of the active forces in the Transitional institutions²¹

I- Call for contributions for the preparation and organization of the Inclusive National Dialogue (DNI)

The Inclusive National Dialogue (DNI) was presented as a key step in achieving the ambitious

libreville/>
21. Table taken from the press conference of March 01, 2024. Transition in Gabon: Observations and perspectives after 6 months? From the Old Order to the New Order, Rebalance THE ADJUSTMENT SCREW. <<https://droit-et-politique-en-afrique.info/6-mois-de-transition-au-gabon-observations-et-perspectives>>

Label	Total	Politics	Military	Civil society
Government of September 9, 2023	26	17 (65%)	03 (12%)	06 (23%)
National Transitional Assembly	98	82 (84%)	06 (06%)	10 (10%)
Transitional SENATE	70	37 (53%)	06 (09%)	27 (38%)
Local Transitional authorities	278	232 (84%)	37 (13%)	09 (03%)
Total number of actors in the deliberative bodies	472	370 (78%)	52 (11%)	52 (11%)

Table 2. Comparative table of the representativeness of the active forces in the Transitional institutions

Label	Number of members	Politic	Military	Social representatives	Dominant force
Mali	172	18 (10%)	27 (16%)	127 (74%)	Civil society
Chad	237	172 (73%)	23 (09%)	42 (18%)	Politic
Guinea	108	27 (25%)	11 (10%)	70 (65%)	Civil society
Burkina Faso	94	12 (13%)	39 (41%)	43 (46%)	Civil society
Niger	26	03 (12%)	03 (12%)	20 (76%)	Civil society
Gabon	194	137 (71%)	15 (08%)	42 (21%)	Politic

Table 3. Table showing the composition of the central government (government and parliament) in countries with economies in transition

institutional restoration project promised by the CTRI (see Appendix 4). The resolutions that emerged from this dialogue were designed to serve as the foundation for a new Constitution and a renewed State²².

All Gabonese citizens were invited to contribute by submitting proposals from October 2, 2023 to February 2024. This participatory model aimed to guarantee the legitimacy and inclusiveness of the DNI, with a call for contributions that collected 38,140 proposals and an announced participation of 600 actors in the work, organized from April 2 to 30, 2024 (Cf. Appendix 3).

Table 3. Table showing the composition of the central government (government and parliament) in countries with economies in transition.²³

22. «À-propos», Inclusive National Dialogue. Accessed on 07/01/2025. <<https://www.dialoguenationalinclusif.ga/commissions/apropos>>
23. Table taken from the press conference of March 01, 2024. Transition in Gabon: Observations and perspectives after 6 months? From the Old Order to the New Order, Rebalance THE ADJUSTMENT SCREW. <<https://droit-et-politique-en-afrique.info/6-mois-de-transition-au-gabon-observations-et-perspectives>>

The final resolutions were validated by three main committees (Political, Economic and Social) and their twelve thematic sub-committees. However, the process has been criticized for its relative opacity:

- The detailed contents of the 38,140 proposals have never been made public.
- The composition of the commission responsible for summarizing these contributions remained unknown, raising doubts about the objectivity of the data processing.

The method of appointing participants has also been criticised. A shortlist of representatives was proposed, and the final participants were selected by the commission, an arbitrary process. In addition, the number of participants initially announced (1,000) has been reduced to 600, reinforcing questions about real inclusivity. Finally, the cost of the DNI, estimated at between 3 and 5 billion CFA francs, has been considered disproportionate by many observers²⁴.

transition-au-gabon-observations-et-perspectives>
24. “Gabon’s Refoundation: The National Dialogue Will Cost Between 3 and 5 Billion CFA”, Gabon Review.

Several resolutions, made public during the official submission of the DNI report, have sparked controversy:

- The suspension of political parties;
- The prohibition of dual nationals from holding high administrative positions in the State;
- The extension of the presidential term from five to seven years, renewable once with a two-round majority vote.

These measures have revived old debates. Under the presidencies of Omar and Ali Bongo Ondimba, the presidential term was set at seven years until 2023. The 2023 constitutional revision had harmonized the duration of political mandates, which was 5 years with no limit on the number of mandates as well as the adoption of a one-round vote for all elections.

J- Launch of the Republican Tour of the President of the Transition

This trip, which began on December 3, 2023 in the province of Ogooué-Maritime and ended on August 12, 2024 in the province of Estuary, aimed to allow the President of the Transition to establish direct contact with the populations of all localities in the country. It was also a question of collecting socio-economic and infrastructural grievances in each commune and department, while presenting the main missions of the Transitional Government.

In each province visited, an envelope of seven billion CFA francs has been allocated for the development of priority socio-infrastructure projects. These moments of exchange and proximity with the populations have allowed the CTIRI and its President to launch the work of various projects, largely included in the National Transition Development Plan (PNDT).

While this initiative was generally welcomed by the local population, it quickly took on the appearance of an early election campaign. The strong popular mobilization, accompanied by a cult of personality around the General President of the Transition, has been amplified by incessant calls for his candidacy.

It should be noted that since February 27, 2025, the management of the funds allocated during this tour has been the subject of a control mission to assess the progress of the projects launched across Gabon, which seems to corroborate sus-

Published on 21/02/2024. <<https://www.gabonreview.com/refondation-du-gabon-le-dialogue-national-couterait-entre-3-et-5-milliards-cfa/>>

picious about the actual use of these funds. In addition, the financial allocations intended for each locality have sometimes been presented as “donations” from the Head of State²⁵, although they are in fact public funds. Also, communications on the timetable of the Transition and the respect of the commitments made have been parasitized by these practices of political clientelism, directly inherited from the reign of the BONGOs.

K- Establishment of a National Constitutional Committee and organization of a constitutional referendum

Announced in the CTIRI’s press release n°58, the National Constitutional Committee (CCN) was officially set up on May 7, 2024, with the mission of drafting the draft Constitution to be submitted to the President of the Transition within one month. This initiative represents a crucial step in the restoration of institutions undertaken by the CTIRI.

Composed of 21 members, including three ministers (Minister of Institutional Reform, Minister of Defense and Minister of Justice), the CCN aims to meet the aspirations of the Gabonese people, expressed in the resolutions resulting from the DNI. In particular, he must propose a new constitution and a new electoral code, texts that are supposed to lay the foundations of a renewed political system.

During the delivery of the DNI’s report, the President of the Transition announced the creation of a Committee to monitor and follow up on the conclusions of the DNI, responsible for working on the establishment of a Constituent Assembly to draft and submit the new Constitution to a referendum. In this respect, the CCN seems to have replaced this committee, a divergence that has not failed to be debated.

Other criticisms have also emerged regarding the composition and operating methods of the CCN:

1. Criteria for selecting members: The criteria for choosing members have not been made public, which has fuelled suspicions;
2. Unbalanced representation: The presence of ministers on the committee was perceived as an important political weight, while other bodies of the Transition, such as Parliament and the Constitutional Court, were not involved;
3. Academic over-representation: A significant proportion of the members came from the academic community, including some indi-

25. “Republican Tour”, Gabon24. Published on 13/12/2023. <https://www.tiktok.com/@gabon24_tv/video/7312094192681946374>

viduals suspected of having been close to the deposed regime or whose civic engagement is deemed insufficient;

4. Absence of key actors: The notable absence of human rights defenders and critical figures of the Gabonese political system has been denounced, depriving the CCN of essential points of view for credible reform.

Although the draft constitutional reform was submitted to the President of the Transition on August 31, 2024, early campaigns were conducted from the end of July until the beginning of September. Several political actors openly called on citizens to vote “yes” even though the text had neither been finalized nor made public²⁶. This early turmoil fuelled criticism of the fairness and presumed neutrality of certain institutional actors during this referendum process.

L- Adoption of a Constitution and the new electoral code

The constitutional referendum of 16 November 2024 led to the adoption of the new Constitution with 91.80% of the votes in favour of the “yes” vote²⁷. On December 19, 2024, the text was officially promulgated at a ceremony held at the Place de la Libération.

On January 22, 2025, Decree No. 0072/PR ratified the promulgation of Organic Law No. 001/2025 on the Electoral Code in the Gabonese Republic²⁸. Intended to modernize the electoral system, this new code introduces several key measures:

- “Creation of the Election and Referendum Control Authority (ACER), an independent body responsible for guaranteeing the transparency and regularity of the polls.
- Establishment of the CNOER, a body bringing together several ministerial departments in order to optimize the organization of elections.

26 “Constitutional referendum: the “Yes” campaign is multiplying”, Journal du Gabon.com. Published on 05/08/2024. <<https://www.journaldugabon.com/referendum-constitutionnel-la-campagne-du-oui-se-multiplie/>>

27 “Referendum in Gabon: the “yes” to the Constitution wins with 91.80% of the votes”, RFI. Published on 17/11/2024 <<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241117-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendum-au-gabon-le-oui-%C3%A0-la-constitution-l-emporte-avec-91-80-des-voix>>

28 “A new Electoral Code to strengthen democracy”, Ministry of the Interior and Security of the Gabonese Republic. Published on 27/01/2025. <<https://www.interieur.gouv.ga/9-actualites/603-un-nouveau-code-electoral-pour-renforcer-la-democratie-/>>

- Automatic enrollment of citizens with a Personal Identification Number (PIN).
- Limits on election expenses and the obligation of financial transparency for campaigns.
- Introduction of parliamentary seats for the diaspora, with two representatives dedicated to Gabonese abroad.
- The right to vote granted to imprisoned citizens, subject to the maintenance of their civil rights.
- Extension of the eligibility conditions for certain categories of civil servants, including magistrates, agents of the Defence and Security Forces, as well as senior public accountants, for the post-transition elections.”

These two texts are part of the reforms undertaken to redefine the country’s institutional and electoral architecture. Their adoption marks a significant step forward in the transition process, but it also raises questions about their long-term implications.

The new Constitution, by establishing a strengthened presidential regime, fuelled debates on the distribution of powers and the mechanisms of democratic control. Some observers question the concentration of prerogatives in the hands of the head of state and the institutional balance that this model guarantees.

The Electoral Code, for its part, is the subject of questions about its impact on the fundamental principles of separation of powers and neutrality of institutions. The establishment of electoral supervisory bodies, although a step towards greater



Source : [Sonapresse.com](https://sonapresse.com)

transparency, raises the question of their effective independence and their ability to ensure fair regulation of the elections.

These debates reflect the concerns of various political actors and civil society about the reforms undertaken and their consequences for the democratic consolidation of the country. They highlight the importance of careful monitoring and inclusive dialogue to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the institutional framework under construction.

ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION

At the end of the first year of the Transition, the political governance of the CTRI revealed a dilemma: on the one hand, a desire for a break that was clearly affirmed and widely supported by the population; on the other, a worrying persistence of certain practices inherited from the old system. This ambivalence raises doubts about the ability of the current Transition to keep its promises and carry out its objectives.

As soon as he took office, the President of the Transition pledged to scrupulously respect the timetable of the Transition, with the ambition of restoring constitutional order through the organization of credible, free and transparent elections. To avoid plunging the country back into a socio-political crisis, it is essential that the members of the CTRI keep their commitments. They must guarantee a return to constitutional order at the end of an irreproachable election, where their role will be that of impartial arbiters.

The candidacy of the President of the Transition, which was approached and made official on March 3, seems to have definitively changed this trajectory. The fact remains that the scenario of a non-candidacy on his part would have given the President of the Transition a double historical stature: that of the Liberator, who liberated the country from the vestiges of a fallen regime, and that of the Founding Father of Gabonese democracy, who opened the way to a real democratic alternation.



Source : francetvinfo.fr

ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

The 14 years of Ali Bongo Ondimba’s reign (2009-2023) have been disastrous for the Gabonese economy. The country’s public debt has risen from 20.1% of GDP in 2008 to 70.5% in 2023²⁹. However, over the same period, with cumulative annual budgets of around 40,000 billion CFA francs, Gabon continued to face major structural problems: degraded road infrastructure, insufficient school and hospital systems, limited access to drinking water, massive unemployment and uncontrolled inflation.

These 14 years have also been marked by a series of scandals involving the embezzlement of public funds, orchestrated through fictitious state agencies and extravagant spending. These expenses include expensive events such as the New York Forum Africa in 2014³⁰, the two African Cup of Nations football tournaments (2012 and 2017), and the Libreville International Marathon. These scandals directly or indirectly involve members of Ali Bongo Ondimba’s entourage, including close collaborators and members of his family.

The catastrophic financial situation of the State forced Gabon to resort to a budget support program from the African Development Bank in 2020 for an amount of about 41 billion CFA francs³¹ and then with the IMF in 2021 for an amount of about 553 million US dollars³². Despite this assistance,

29. “Gabon – Public Debt to GDP”, Trading Economics. Accessed on 08/01/2025. <https://fr.tradingeconomics.com/gabon/governmentdebt-to-gdp#:~:text=La%20dette%20publique%20by%20ratio%20to%20GDP%20to%20Gabon%20should,and%20the%20expectations%20of%20analysts>
30. “New York Forum Africa: what is its concrete contribution for Gabon?”, RFI. Published on 05/25/2014 <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20140525-gabon-new-york-forum-africa-polemique-attias-apport-jeunes>
31. “Gabon: the AfDB has released 41 billion CFA francs for the diversification of the economy”, Ecofin Agency. Published on 25/10/2020
32. “The IMF Executive Board Approves an Extended Fund Facility Arrangement of

poor governance has exacerbated the economic crisis and thus undermined the trust of citizens and international donors.

It is in this context of economic disaster and failing governance that the coup d’état of August 30, 2023 occurred. This event brought to light massive embezzlement, with the seizure of tens of billions of CFA francs in the homes of Ali Bongo Ondimba’s wife, son and other relatives³³.

Faced with this heavy legacy, the recovery of the Gabonese economy and the consolidation of public finances are among the priority projects of the CTRI. These efforts are essential to meet the pressing socio-economic expectations of the population and restore Gabon’s confidence with international donors.

EFFECTIVE MEASURES

In its mission to restore institutions, the CTRI has endorsed a series of measures aimed at reviving the economy, meeting the needs of the population and putting the country on the path of good governance, including:

- A. Establishment of the Audit Task Force on Public Procurement - September 2023;
- B. Retrocession of funds and property embezzled into the State’s coffers - October 2023;
- C. Allocation of more than 1800 budget items to the education, health and public media sectors - November 2023;

US\$553.2 Million for Gabon,” IMF. Published on 28/07/2021. <https://www.imf.org/fr/News/Articles/2021/07/28/pr21223-gabon-imf-executive-board-approves-us-553-2-million-extended-arrangement-under-eff>
33. “Coup d’état in Gabon: suitcases of banknotes filmed at the home of relatives of Ali and Sylvia Bongo”, RFI. Published on 01/09/2023. <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230901-coup-d-%C3%A9tat-au-gabon-des-valises-de-billets-film%C3%A9s-ch%C3%A9z-des-proches-d-ali-et-sylvia-bongo>

- D. Strengthening and Extension of the ASYCUDA World Facility - December 2023;
- E. Reinstatement of the payment of school scholarships in middle and high schools - January 2024;
- F. Takeover of the assets of the oil company Addax Petroleum - January 2024;
- G. Retrocession of the State's shares in the ECSC-GADIS group - January 2024;
- H. Alignment and revaluation of State pensions to the New Remuneration System (NSR) - February 2024;
- I. Creation of a national airline FLY Gabon - February 2024;
- J. Implementation of the National Transition Development Plan (PNDT) - March 2024;
- K. Audit of Delta Synergie - March 2024;
- L. Implementation of a mercurial system to combat the high cost of living - March and October 2024;
- M. Creation of a Bank for Trade and Entrepreneurship of Gabon (BCEG) - May 2024;
- N. Takeover and nationalization of the oil group Assala Energy - June 2024;
- O. Application of the employment quota of 80% of Gabonese in foreign private companies established in Gabon - June 2024;
- P. Public debt clean-up - June 2024;
- Q. Reaffirmation of Gabon's commitment to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) process - July 2024;
- R. Acquisition of two presidential aircraft - August 2024;
- S. Implementation of a Presidential Emergency Transition Program (PPUT) - 2025.

REVIEW AND COMMENTS ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES

A close examination of the observations on the effective measures mentioned above makes it possible to assess their relevance and possible limitations.

A- Establishment of the Audit Task Force on Public Procurement

Between 2020 and 2023, Gabon's domestic debt increased sevenfold, from 400 billion CFA francs (4.6% of GDP) to 3,000 billion CFA francs (22% of GDP).³⁴ Faced with this alarming situation, the activation of the Task Force by Order No. 001/

34. "In Gabon, Brice Oligui Nguema is reviving the controversial "debt task force", Jeune Afrique. 03/10/2023. < <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1487099/economie-entreprises/au-gabon-brice-oligui-nguema-redonne-vie-a-la-controversee-task-force-dette/> >

PT/2023 has proven to be a salutary measure for monitoring the execution of public contracts and the consolidation of public finances.

This initiative has revealed widespread practices of over-invoicing, resulting from collusion between senior officials and certain unscrupulous contractors. It also highlighted numerous dysfunctions in the respect of public procurement procedures.

Despite these advances, several points raise questions:

- 1. Lack of transparency: The identity and number of companies pinned down for partially or non-executed projects have not been clearly communicated. Similarly, the lack of legal proceedings against the perpetrators of these fraudulent practices feeds a feeling of opacity;
- 2. Problematic resumption of work: The injunctions made to certain companies to resume abandoned or unexecuted - and often overcharged - sites raise questions. Without clarification of the sanctions or reparations provided, these measures risk reinforcing a sense of complacency and impunity in the face of the financial and infrastructural damage caused.

The 60-day report of the CTRI Debt Task Force identified several notable violations (see Appendix 5):

- **SOWAF:** This company unduly received more than 5 billion CFA francs between 2013 and 2020 for the construction of a technical high school in Gamba before signing a contract of more than 5 billion CFA francs for the construction of the high school in the province of Ogooué-Maritime while the execution rate of the works is estimated at only 15%;
- **SOBEA:** Another construction company overcharged several materials to the tune of more than 6 billion CFA francs in complicity with executives of the Coordination Unit of Study and Works (UCET) under the Ministry of Public Works.

These examples illustrate the systemic excesses that have burdened public finances and slowed down the development of essential infrastructure. Stronger management and firm legal action against those responsible are essential to restore the credibility of institutions and restore citizens' trust.

B- Return of funds and property embezzled to the State's coffers

Following the CTRI coup d'état on August 30, 2023, several searches led to the recovery of 7.2

billion CFA francs from the private homes of figures of the deposed government. In addition, 344 vehicles were also seized.³⁵ This measure allowed the CTRI to replenish the state coffers and to provide several public administrations with means of transport that were sorely lacking.

In the same vein, the private plane of the former first lady Sylvia BONGO, a Boeing 737 registered P4-BBJ, was returned to the State in September 2024³⁶. Although this initiative, which began in November 2023, has been well received by public opinion, some points nevertheless deserve clarification. Indeed, to date, no other sum has been officially handed over, except for the 7 billion CFA francs recovered.

In view of the numerous embezzlement scandals recorded during the fourteen years of Ali Bongo Ondimba's management, it would be relevant for a detailed communication to be carried out to draw up an exhaustive assessment of the seized assets belonging to the former presidential couple and other members of the deposed regime. In addition, legal proceedings against the alleged perpetrators of these financial embezzlement are now expected, instead of simple pre-trial detention and house arrest for certain individuals.

C- Allocation of more than 1800 budget items to the education, health and public media sectors

Following the freeze on recruitment in the civil service, introduced under the regime of Ali Bongo Ondimba in 2015³⁷, the current measure marks an important turning point by calming the social climate dominated by strikes in public administrations. This initiative responds to a pressing need to improve the working conditions of civil servants and to provide them with better career prospects. In addition, it is a significant step towards improving the living conditions of several families of civil servants, who were in a precarious professional situation.

35. "Operation dignity: 7 billion and 344 vehicles stolen by Ali Bongo's relatives handed over to the Prime Minister", Gabonactu.com. 06/10/2023. < <https://gabonactu.com/blog/2023/10/06/operation-dignite-7-milliards-et-344-vehicules-voles-par-les-proches-dali-bongo-remis-au-1er-ministre/> >

36. "Sylvia Bongo gives up her plane to Brice Oligui Nguema", Mondafrigue. 18/09/2024. < <https://mondafrique.com/confidentiels/sylvia-bongo-cede-son-avion-a-brice-oligui-nguema/> >

37. "Public Jobs: Blocked Horizon for New Graduates?", Gabon Review. 24/06/2018. < <https://www.gabonreview.com/emplois-publics-horizon-bouche-pour-les-nouveaux-diplomes/> >

However, beyond the obvious social benefits, this measure could pose risks to Gabon's public financial management. With a debt ratio estimated in 2024 at 70.5% of GDP by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)³⁸ now estimated at 55.2% of GDP according to the Gabonese authorities³⁹, the expansion of the wage bill in the public service could compromise the country's economic stability. In addition, the World Bank suspended disbursements for payment arrears in January 2025 for the second time in less than a year.⁴⁰ The strategy for managing the wage bill could thus be undermined, leading to additional costs that are difficult to finance in a fragile economic context.

The socio-economic relevance of this measure must therefore be put into perspective with the need to carry out an exhaustive census or a rigorous audit of civil servants. This would limit the risks of an unsustainable increase in the wage bill, particularly in the event of non-control of recruitment. In addition, according to the data contained in the 2024 Public Finance Amending Law, it is important to note that the Defence and Security Forces (FDS) concentrate more civil servants than the education and health sectors, which raises questions about human resources and social development priorities.

38. "IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultations with Gabon," International Monetary Fund. 30/05/2024. < <https://www.imf.org/fr/News/Articles/2024/05/28/pr24187-gabon-imf-executive-board-concludes-2014-art-iv-consult> >

39. "Gabon: a debt rate reduced to 55.2% of GDP, far from the community threshold of 70%", Gabon Media Time. 05/02/2025. < <https://gabonmediatime.com/gabon-un-taux-dendettement-reduit-a-552-du-pib-loin-du-seuil-communautaire-de-70/> >

40. "Gabon: the World Bank has suspended its disbursements due to debt arrears", RFI. 14/01/2025. < <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/C3%A9conomie/20250114-gabon-la-banque-mondiale-a-suspendu-ses-d%C3%A9caissements-en-raison-d-arri%C3%A9r%C3%A9s-de-dettes> >



Source : ecomnewsafrique.com

Label	PLF 2024	
	Headcount	Salary expenses
Prime Minister's Office	678	4 991 535 827
Ministry of Institutional Reform	621	4 663 103 192
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of Sub-Regional Integration and Gabonese Abroad	811	5 876 482 558
Ministry of Justice, Keeper of the Seals	5114	38 247 388 081
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs	14 559	84 469 682 457
Ministry of National Education, in charge of Civic Training	25 532	187 677 898 921
Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Technological Innovation	3552	32 628 766 513
Ministry of Labor and the Fight Against Unemployment	845	5 796 680 927
Ministry of the Public Service and Capacity Building	1 127	6 574 541 928
Ministry of Public Works	867	5 942 784 888
Ministry of Housing, Urban Planning, and Land Registry	530	3 897 959 050
Ministry of Culture, Youth, Sports and the Arts	1 779	11 835 976 619
Ministry of Water and Forests in charge of Environmental Preservation, Climate, and Human-Wildlife Conflict	1 334	10 683 900 397
Ministry of Petroleum	496	3 990 736 480
Ministry of Mines	166	1 501 193 700
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries	1 554	9 789 282 260
Ministry of Transport, Merchant Marine, and the Sea	1 041	4 969 144 296
Ministry of Energy and Water Ressources	200	2 053 537 059
Ministry of Trade, SMEs/SMIs in charge of Income-Generating Activities	1 742	12 251 302 413
Ministry of Tourism and Handicrafts	412	2 614 432 548
Ministry of New Information and Communication Technologies	1 086	6 961 185 116
Ministry of Public Accounts	3 847	21 773 541 905
Ministry of Economy and Participations	2 831	18 782 402 238
Ministry of National Defense	30 013	187 773 327 586
Ministry of the Interior	8 198	60 595 552 649
Total Ministries	108 933	736 342 339 607
General total	112 077	771 749 096 325

Table 4. Table of ceilings for State employment authorisations by ministry⁴¹

D- Strengthening and expanding the ASYCUDAWORLD system

ASYCUDA is a computerized customs management system designed to cover all procedures related to foreign trade, such as transit procedures, customs declarations, accounting operations and other administrative activities.

In addition to promoting transparency and efficiency, this tool represents a unique opportunity to

41. Initial Finance Law 2024. Presidency of the Republic. 22/01/2024. < chrome-extension://efaidnbmninnbpcjpcglclefindmkaj/https://economie.gouv.ga/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/LOI-DE-FINANCES-2024-INITIALE.pdf >

restore trust in customs administrations. However, its full potential will only be exploited if the shortcomings it exposes are accompanied by corrective measures, including investigations and sanctions.

Acquired in April 2019, the ASYCUDAWORLD system has enabled a spectacular optimization of customs revenues while exposing the misappropriation of taxes and tax fees within the financial and customs authorities. For example, in January 2024, customs revenue from the Bitam border crossing reached 265,212,014 CFA francs, compared to only 26,796,283 CFA francs for the same month in 2023⁴². This result illustrates the effectiveness of

42. “Customs: revenues multiplied by 10 in Bitam”, Gabon Review. 03/02/2024. < https://www.gabonreview.com/douanes-les-recettes-multipliees-par-10-a-bitam/ >

this tool in optimizing tax revenues and highlighting fraudulent practices.

Despite these notable performances, several grey areas remain:

- **Lack of investigations:** The dramatic increase in revenue, revealed by the system, should have led to thorough investigations to identify those responsible for the alleged embezzlement within customs administrations;
- **Lack of sanctions:** The lack of repressive measures or prosecution of perpetrators fuels a sense of impunity. This lack of action risks undermining the impact of the reforms undertaken.

E-Reinstatement of the payment of school grants in middle and high schools

From 2012 to 2017, the payment of school scholarships, amounting to 24,000 CFA francs per quarter⁴³, had not been regular in Gabon's high schools and colleges before it was definitively abolished in 2017. The resumption of this system in January 2024 is a measure of social justice, particularly welcomed by the population and young people in particular.

The payment arrangements for these scholarships have been marked by operational difficulties, particularly with regard to payment procedures and the planning of payment dates. These dysfunctions also affect university scholarships, which have led to delays in payment, sometimes of several months, and financial difficulties among the beneficiaries.⁴⁴ Clashes took place between beneficiaries and the police.⁴⁵

To ensure the sustainability of this system and improve its management, an audit of the stock

43. “In Gabon, students demonstrate against the tightening of the cost of obtaining a scholarship”, RFI. 09/01/2024. < https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240109-au-gabon-les-%C3%A9l%C3%A8ves-manifestent-contre-le-durcissement-d-obtention-d-une-bourse >
44. “Unpaid scholarships: ANBG pushes students to drop out”, Gabon Review. 03/12/2024. < https://www.gabonreview.com/bourses-impayees-lanbg-pousse-les-etudiants-vers-labandon/#::-:text=Depuis%20plusieurs%20mois%2C%20l'Agence,boursiers%20dans%20une%20situation%20critique. >
45. “Gabon: clashes between students and police at the ANBG for the payment of scholarships”, Gabon Media Time. 22/01/2025. < https://gabonmediatime.com/gabon-affrontements-entre-etudiants-et-policiers-a-lanbg-pour-le-paiement-des-bourses/#::-:text=Des%20%C3%A9tudiants%2C%20exc%C3%A9d%C3%A9s%20par%-20pr%C3%A8s,qui%20vire%20%C3%A0%20la%20confrontation. >

exchange system seems necessary. This would allow for an objective assessment of the associated costs and the readjustment of mechanisms to ensure equitable distribution and stable long-term financing.

F-Takeover of the assets of the oil company Addax Petroleum

Through a letter dated January 5, 2024 (Cf. Appendix 6), the Directorate General of Hydrocarbons summoned the Chinese group Addax Petroleum to return to the private domain of the State the “Dionga Irundu permit No. G5-118”, whose award contract was due to expire in March 2024⁴⁶. This decision follows the acquisition of Assala Energy and is part of the policy of reaffirming Gabon's oil sovereignty. With this in mind, Gabon Oil Company (GOC), the national oil company, has taken over Addax Petroleum's assets, consolidating the state's control over this strategic sector of its economy.

This step towards strengthened sovereignty raises a significant managerial challenge, particularly because of the financial embezzlement scandals that have tarnished GOC's image over the past three years. These scandals, linked to poor management of the company's finances, highlight the governance risks that could undermine the effectiveness of this takeover.

Strengthening the management of GOC is therefore crucial to ensure that the recovery of these assets generates sustainable benefits for the State, while avoiding the repetition of past mistakes. Internal reform, combined with increased transparency and rigorous management, will be necessary to make this initiative a real lever for development.

G- Retrocession of the State's shares in the ECSC-GADIS group

In January 2024, the Gabonese State acquired 35% of the shares of the CECA-GADIS supermarket group on the grounds that these shares had been improperly held. This has highlighted that the State's shares in certain parastatals were not only confiscated, but also embezzled. This approach marks a clear desire to clean up public finances, while affirming that the State is finally regaining control of hidden parts of its revenues.

46. “Oil: China's Addax Petroleum ordered to return to the State its only oil permit in production”, Gabon Actu. Published on 09/01/2024. <https://gabonactu.com/blog/2024/01/09/petrole-le-chinois-addax-petroleum-somme-de-restituer-a-letat-son-unique-permis-petrolier-en-production/>

The controversial privatisation cycle of state-owned enterprises that took place between 1994 and 2005 has left its mark, making the acquisition of shareholdings and the return of state shares particularly delicate. This represents a real challenge for the managerial capacities of the CTRI, which must ensure that the management of these public assets is optimised and transparent.

This situation requires in-depth investigations and could, if necessary, lead to compensation for the state, as it highlights an improper appropriation of public revenues for personal gain.

H- Linking and revaluation of State pensions to the New Remuneration System (NSR)

Faced with galloping inflation in January 2024 (estimated at 3.4%, slightly exceeding the convergence ceiling set at 3% by the CEMAC⁴⁷) which has heavily affected the purchasing power of households and made the middle classes more precarious, the revaluation of retirement pensions appears to be an essential measure of social justice. Since the introduction of the New Remuneration System (NSR) in 2015, pensions had never been adjusted in line with salary increases, leaving retirees in a critical financial situation.

This increase was in response to the demands of nearly 26,000 retired state employees, who were suffering not only from late payments but also from insufficient pension amounts. As of February 2024, this initiative has made it possible to mobilize 28 billion CFA francs from the Pension and Family Benefits Fund (CPPF), giving hope to 16,000 retirees⁴⁸. However, with a total estimated cost of 56 billion CFA francs, additional efforts are needed to definitively settle this issue.

Two measures have been associated with this reform:

- 1. The increase in contributions for civil servants: the pension contribution rate has been raised by one point, from 6% to 7%.⁴⁹

47. Evolution of inflation in the CEMAC at the end of September 2024 and short- and medium-term outlook. BEAC. December 2024. < chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.beac.int/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/note_inflation_CEMAC_T42024_version-publiable.pdf >

48. “26 billion CFA francs to pay the recalls of retired civil servants from February 2024”, [Gabonactu.com](https://gabonactu.com), 12/01/2024. < <https://gabonactu.com/blog/2024/01/12/28-milliards-de-fcfa-pour-payer-les-rappels-des-fonctionnaires-retraites-des-fevrier-2024/> >

49. “New pension scheme was promulgated and

- 2. Raising the retirement age for civil servants of the State: the legal retirement age has been raised from 60 to 62, which was perceived as an additional constraint and frustration for young people waiting to be recruited as civil servants⁵⁰. This increase in the retirement age has been criticized by civil servants given the average life expectancy in Gabon which is about 64 years.⁵¹⁵²

I- Creation of a national airline FLY Gabon

After the bankruptcy of the former national airline Air Gabon in 2006, the launch of FLY Gabon arouses real national pride, symbolizing the great return of Gabon’s air sovereignty. In a country marked by failing road networks, this new airline could greatly facilitate internal travel, while strengthening regional connectivity.

Announced in February 2024, the airline Fly Gabon was officially inaugurated on August 29, 2024.⁵³ The first two aircraft, ATR 72-600s, were obtained on a leasing basis⁵⁴, due to the country’s restrictive financial context. While this initiative is welcomed for its strategic scope, several questions remain. The price of tickets, considered too expensive by many observers, raises concerns

put into force in February 2024”, Gabonese Republic, Ministry of Public Accounts and Debt. 19/04/2024. < <https://www.budget.gouv.ga/9-actualites/2313-nouveau-regime-de-pension-a-ete-promulgue-et-mis-en-vigueur-en-fevrier-2024/> >

50. “Gabon: the government wants to increase the retirement of civil servants from 60 to 62 years old”, RFI. 11/02/2024. < <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240211-gabon-le-gouvernement-veut-faire-passer-la-retraite-des-agents-civils-de-60-%C3%A0-62-ans> >

51. “A new remuneration system for Gabonese retirees”, VOA. 12/02/2024. < <https://www.voaafrique.com/a/un-nouveau-syst%C3%A8me-de-r%C3%A9mun%C3%A9ration-pour-les-retrait%C3%A9s-gabonais/7483833.html> >

52. “Cheating on age”: in Gabon, the pension reform comes up against several pitfalls”, [le360 Afrique](https://afrique.le360.ma/). 15/02/2024. < https://afrique.le360.ma/societe/tricherie-sur-lage-au-gabon-la-reforme-de-la-retraite-butte-sur-plusieurs-ecueils_IE3ZR4U3ERDXHHX6TPSOFFOJIU/ >

53. “Gabon: ANAC at the heart of the launch of Fly Gabon”, 04/09/2024. < <https://gabonmediatime.com/gabon-lanac-au-coeur-du1-lancement-de-fly-gabon/> >

54. “Fly Gabon: A second ATR 72-600 lands in Libreville”, [Gabon Review](https://www.gabonreview.com). 13/07/2024. < <https://www.gabonreview.com/fly-gabon-un-second-atr-72-600-atterrit-a-libreville/> >

about the accessibility of the service for a large part of the population.

In addition, the announced merger with the private company Afrijet⁵⁵ raises questions about the joint management mechanisms and the impact on competition. Finally, the cost of the initiative, as well as the expected benefits, should be clarified, particularly in an aviation sector known for its fierce competition and operational challenges.

J- Implementation of the National Transition Development Plan

Validated in March 2024⁵⁶, the National Transition Development Plan (PNDT) covers the three-year period from 2024 to 2026. Through this ambitious plan, the Gabonese government plans to invest 3000 billion CFA francs for the realization of 288 priority projects, affecting essential sectors such as road infrastructure, energy, health, education, agriculture and transport. The main objective is to reduce inequalities in development and to support the process of political transition, in order to build a new Gabon. The NTDP will thus become the reference to guide government investments in the next two years.

Although the need for this plan is indisputable, given the disastrous socio-economic situation of the country, a legacy of management under the regime of Ali Bongo Ondimba, its implementation raises certain political questions. Indeed, its three-year duration, which goes beyond the Transition, raises questions about the desire to leave the power of the CTRI. Moreover, this plan seems to deviate somewhat from the CTRI’s main mission, which is to restore institutions and not to manage a broad economic recovery program. In normal times, such a project should be the responsibility of a government legitimized by a presidential election, thus marking the end of the Transition.

Finally, the downward revision of its initial financing, from 4536 billion to 3697 billion CFA francs,

55. “Air transport: Fly Air Gabon makes its first investment by becoming a shareholder of Afrijet”, [EcoMatin](https://ecomatin.net). 13/03/2024. < ecomatin.net/transport-aerien-fly-air-gabon-realise-son-premier-investissement-en-devenant-actionnaire-dafrijet >

56. “The Prime Minister launches the work of the National Development Plan of the Transition”, Gabonese Prime Minister. Published on 27/03/2024. < <https://www.primature.gouv.ga/2-actualites/1406-economie-/2270-le-premier-ministre-lance-les-travaux-du-plan-national-de-developpement-de-la-transition/> >

i.e. a reduction of 19%,⁵⁷ and the difficulties in mobilizing the necessary funds could constitute structural and cyclical obstacles to its effective implementation.

K- Audit of Delta Synergie

The Delta Synergie Holding, managed by the BONGO family, is often considered as an instrument of private enrichment to the detriment of the Gabonese people and generates about 28 billion CFA francs in annual profits, divided among 53 beneficiaries, and is suspected of controlling a considerable part of the national economy.⁵⁸ According to some reports, it holds stakes in a multitude of companies⁵⁹, without any real transparency as to the exact structure of these assets.

The announcement of an audit of this holding company on 20 March 2024⁶⁰ is a decisive step in the quest for transparency and accountability. This audit could finally reveal the identity of the beneficiaries, the companies in which Delta Synergie has shareholdings, and the amounts of its assets. Such an initiative would constitute a major break in the recovery of the Gabonese economy and the consolidation of public finances initiated by the CTRI.

Beyond the suspicions of illicit enrichment, the transparency required by this audit should lead to legal action, making it possible to sanction illegal behaviour and restore public trust. The impartiality of the experts in charge of this mission is essential, as the stakes are considerable for the future of the national economy. Finally, the results of this audit could lift the veil on the central role and influence

57. “Gabon: after revision, the amount of the PNDT increases from 4536 to 3697 billion”, [Gabon Media Time](https://gabonmediatime.com). 02/06/2024. < <https://gabonmediatime.com/gabon-apres-revision-le-montant-du-pndt-passe-de-4536-a-3697-milliards/> >

58. “Delta Synergie audit: 53 beneficiaries and 14 companies in the CTRI’s sights”, [Gabon Media Time](https://gabonmediatime.com). 28/03/2024. < <https://gabonmediatime.com/audit-delta-synergie-53-beneficiaires-et-14-societes-dans-le-viseur-du-ctri/> >

59. “Close-up on the business relations between the Bongo family and several big names in the CAC40”, [Observatory of Multinationals](https://multinationales.org). 19/03/2015. < <https://multinationales.org/fr/a-chaud/actualites/gros-plan-sur-les-relations-d-affaires-entre-la-famille-bongo-et-plusieurs> >

60. “Gabon: the CTRI announces a general audit of the Delta Synergie des Bongo Holding”, [Gabon Media Time](https://gabonmediatime.com). 20/03/2024. < <https://multinationales.org/fr/a-chaud/actualites/gros-plan-sur-les-relations-d-affaires-entre-la-famille-bongo-et-plusieurs> >

of the BONGO clan on the Gabonese economic system, thus contributing to a real dismantling of the monopolies that have fueled corruption and inequality in the country.

L- Establishment of a mercurial system to combat the high cost of living

The Covid-19 pandemic has led to a surge in inflation rates in many countries, worsening the daily lives of populations already weakened by low incomes. In an attempt to contain this unfavorable economic situation, the Transitional government set up a mercurial in March and October 2024. The mercurial price is a mechanism for controlling public spending used exclusively in the context of transactions with the State. It constitutes a directory of the prices set and accepted by the administration. While this initiative is not new, its extension to a broader list of products is attracting attention.

The mercurial now caps the prices of strategic products such as fuel for businesses, building materials, and a wide range of foodstuffs. This measure, which has been welcomed by the population, aims to mitigate the impact of inflation on households.

However, several obstacles hinder the effectiveness of mercurial:

- Speculative practices: Some unscrupulous wholesalers and distributors withhold stocks of essential products, such as sugar and oil, even though they are manufactured locally. These practices lead to “artificial” shortages that cause unjustified price increases. Checks in shops have been carried out by the authorities;
- Failures in the chain of custody: Weaknesses in monitoring and regulation mechanisms may reduce the effectiveness of the mercurial. Better coordination between public and private actors is essential to ensure its rigorous implementation;
- Regional comparison: A comparative study of the cost of living in Gabon compared to other countries in the CEMAC zone would be essential. This would make it possible to propose more appropriate reforms and to improve the standard of living of the Gabonese people in the long term.

Although the mercurial price is an important measure to control the effects of inflation, its full effectiveness depends on a strict repression of speculative practices, a strengthening of con-

trols, and a broader economic vision that integrates regional realities.

M-Creation of a Bank for Trade and Entrepreneurship of Gabon (BCEG)

Announced during the end-of-year speech of the President of the Transition on December 31, 2023, the creation of the Bank for Trade and Entrepreneurship of Gabon (BCEG) aims to support Gabonese SMEs/SMLs and promote the emergence of a real class of national entrepreneurs. With an initial capital of 4 billion CFA francs mobilized by the State⁶¹, this initiative aims to contribute to the diversification of the Gabonese economy.

However, several aspects of this project raise questions about its planning and feasibility:

1. Absence in the 2024 Finance Law: despite its announcement with great fanfare, the BCEG project does not appear in the 2024 Finance Bill⁶² presented by the Transitional Government in December 2023. This leaves doubts about its integration into the State’s budgetary priorities;
 2. Lack of clear budget forecasts: the initial capital of 4 billion CFA francs, although mobilized, does not seem to be attached to any specific budget line, which raises questions about the transparency and financial viability of the project;
- The BCEG represents a promising initiative to stimulate local entrepreneurship and diversify the Gabonese economy. Nevertheless, clarifications on its planning, budget structure, and institutional positioning are needed to dispel doubts and ensure its success.

N- Takeover and nationalization of the oil group Assala Energy

By exercising its right of pre-emption for the purchase of Assala Energy to the tune of more than 648 billion CFA francs, the Gabonese State is taking a decisive step towards regaining direct control of its production and the sale of its oil by now controlling 25% of its production⁶³. This gesture

61. “Gabon: 4 billion FCFA, starting capital for the BCEG”, Gabon Review. 08/05/2024. < [https://economie.gouv.ga/lois-de-finances/](https://gabon24.tv/gabon-la-banque-pour-le-commerce-et-lentrepreneuriat-deja-creee-annonce-ulrich-manfoumbi-manfoumbi/#:~:text=C'est%20dans%20cette%20optique,%C3%A0%20150%20millions%20de%20FCFA.> >
62. “Finance Laws”, Ministry of Economy and Shareholdings of the Gabonese Republic. Published on 22/07/2024. <
63. “Takeover of Assala: Gabon now controls 25% of its

marks a desire to reaffirm national sovereignty over a strategic sector, which accounts for 60% of the country’s tax revenues and 80% of its export revenues.⁶⁴

With a production of about 45,000 barrels per day and an annual turnover exceeding 600 billion CFA francs,⁶⁵ Assala Energy, Gabon’s second largest oil operator, should significantly contribute to the increase in the State’s budget revenues.

Despite the obvious advantages in terms of economic sovereignty, several grey areas surround this transaction:

1. **Lack of financial transparency:**
The transaction was carried out without clear information on the financial arrangements that made this takeover possible. This opacity raises questions about the financing methods and the potential counterparts involved.
2. **Management and efficiency challenges:**
Taking over the management of such a strategic company directly involves significant challenges, particularly in terms of technical skills, governance and the fight against corruption. Poor management could dilute the expected benefits of this takeover.

The takeover of Assala Energy by the Gabonese state is a strong gesture to reaffirm economic sovereignty and maximize national oil revenues. To prevent this initiative from being tarnished by controversies, clarifications on the financial modalities, international partnerships, and governance mechanisms are essential. Increased transparency will be the key to strengthening citizens’ and investors’ confidence in this ambitious approach.

O- Application of the employment quota of 80% of Gabonese in foreign private companies established in Gabon

With a massive unemployment rate estimated at 36% among young people aged 15 to 24⁶⁶, the

oil production”, Ecofin Agency. 07/07/2024. < [>](https://www.agenceecofin.com/energie/0707-120093-rachat-d-assala-le-gabon-controle-desormais-25-de-sa-production-petroliere) >
64. Ibid.
65. “Gabon: the State buys Assala Energy in partnership with Gunvor”, Financial Afrik. 23/06/2024. < [>](https://www.financialafrik.com/2024/06/23/gabon-letat-rachete-dassala-energy-en-partenariat-avec-gunvor/#:~:text=Le%20Gabon%20a%20vers%C3%A9%20le,milliards%20de%20FCFA%20par%20an) >
66. Graphic. Unemployment (% of total labour force aged 15-24), Gabon. World Perspective. 2023. <

measure announced by the CTRLI aims to promote access to employment for Gabonese. This initiative also responds to the application of Article 137 of the Labour Code, which gives priority to workers of Gabonese nationality with equal skills, long neglected by the administration under the deposed regime, but now put forward to strengthen the rights of local workers. Thus, the Gabonese government has set a maximum quota of 30% for foreign labor, “at a rate of 5% for executive staff, 10% for senior technicians and supervisors, and 15% for executives”.⁶⁷

To ensure the success of this measure, the active involvement of trade unions will be essential. Indeed, companies such as FOBERD-Gabon have recently been pinned for non-compliance with the Labour Code⁶⁸, which highlights the challenges faced by the authorities in ensuring real implementation of standards. The administration, still plagued by active and passive corruption practices, will have to face this problem to guarantee the effectiveness of the reforms.

In addition, social movements and inspections in areas such as the Nkok Special Investment Zone (ZIS) as well as in several private companies highlight the non-compliance with the SMIG (Guaranteed Interprofessional Minimum Wage) and deplorable working conditions⁶⁹. These practices partly explain the low employability of the Gabonese and the disaffection of the unemployed for a job market that is often perceived as inequitable. In this way, the participation of trade unions could not only support this reform, but also ensure rigorous control over the improvement of working conditions and the application of minimum wages.

P-Cleaning up the public debt

The Ministry of Economy and Participations announced in June 2024⁷⁰ a repayment of the pub-

[>](https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMTendanceStatPays/?codeStat=SL.UEM.1524.ZS&codePays=GAB&codeTheme=8) >
67. “Gabon: The foreign labour quota limited to 30%”, El Watan. Published on 01/07/2024. <[>](https://elwatan-dz.com/gabon-le-quota-de-main-doeuvre-etrangere-limite-a-30) >
68. “Gabon: execrable working conditions, lack of respect for the environment, when Foberd defies the CTRLI!”, Gabon Media Time. 01/08/2024. < [https://gabonmediatime.com/gabon-conditions-de-travail-execrables-non-respect-de-lenvironnement-quand-foberd-defit-le-ctrli/](https://gabonmediatime.com/gabon-conditions-de-travail-execrables-non-respect-de-lenvironnement-quand-foberd-defit-le-ctrli/>) >
69. “ZIS de Nkok: 14 companies put on notice for irregular situations”, Le Nouveau Gabon. 14/09/2023. < [>](https://www.lenouveaugabon.com/fr/sante-social/1409-20119-zis-de-nkok-14-societes-mises-en-demeure-pour-situations-irregulieres) >
70. “New Era of Progress: Economic Reforms under

lic debt of 884 billion CFA francs in the space of 8 months, a performance that illustrates Gabon's stated desire to reduce its debt level. Faced with an overall debt estimated at 7,000 billion CFA francs, or 70.5% of GDP, this approach aims to preserve the country's economic stability, which was jeopardized by the accumulation of debts under the deposed regime, marked by poor governance and the lack of transparency on the real data of the debt.

payment deadlines. Since November 2023, clearer and more detailed information has been published to inform public opinion and international partners on progress in debt reduction.

In July 2024, the International Monetary Fund expressed reservations about a risk of debt distress⁷² that could call into question the progress made. In addition, the downgrading of Gabon's sovereign rating by the rating agency Moody's in

Q- Reaffirmation of Gabon's commitment to the EITI process

The Gabonese government's political commitment to the effective implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was reflected in the validation of the national report in July 2024. This initiative, launched in 2003, aims to promote transparency in the management of revenues from the extractive industries, particularly in the oil, mining and forestry sectors. The EITI ensures that governments and public or private companies make their transactions public, helping to fight corruption and ensure that natural resources benefit the sustainable development of countries.

In addition, the Gabonese government's commitment to greater transparency in the management of natural resources was extended in July and August 2024 with the publication of the state's forestry, mining and oil permits and contracts, in partnership with private companies.⁷⁴ This approach marks a significant step towards more transparent and accountable management, in contrast to the recurrence of the opacity that characterized the management of natural resources under the ousted regime.

Thus, the implementation of the EITI and the publication of reports and contracts related to the exploitation of natural resources testify to the desire to break with past practices and a commitment to better economic management of the revenues generated. While these advances are promising, the role of civil society in the process needs to be strengthened. An alternative report, written by independent actors, would ensure the credibility of the information published and strengthen public trust. Finally, a renegotiation of certain contracts could be considered, in order to ensure that the operating conditions truly benefit the Gabonese population.

R- Acquisition of two presidential aircraft

According to Africa *Intelligence*⁷⁵ magazine, between the end of July and mid-August 2024,

the Transition authorities acquired two luxury aircraft: a 13-year-old Gulfstream G550 (MSN 5311) at an estimated cost of 44 million euros (about 28.8 billion CFA francs) and an Embraer E145 (MSN 145695), a 21-year-old 30-seat aircraft in VIP class whose new price is estimated at 16.5 million euros (10.5 billion CFA francs). The objective of these acquisitions would be to facilitate the travel of the president and members of the government. It should be noted that General Brice Clotaire OLIGUI NGUEMA would have made his trips until now aboard a leased Airbus A320 VIP, belonging to the Burkinabe company Liza Transport International.⁷⁶

This new acquisition brings to three the number of aircraft now owned by the presidency, after the recovery, in early 2024, of Ali BONGO ONDIMBA's aircraft: a Gulfstream G650, registered TR-KGM, grounded in Basel, Switzerland, since May 2023, due to unpaid invoices.⁷⁷

While this initiative can be justified on a practical level to meet the sovereign needs of the State, the lack of transparent communication regarding the conditions of acquisition and the amounts disbursed raises questions, especially in an already difficult economic context. In particular, the 21-year-old age of the Embraer E145 could raise questions about the appropriateness of this purchase, especially since the lifespan of a commercial aircraft is generally estimated to be between 25 and 30 years.⁷⁸ The cost and longevity of this device, in this specific context, deserve a more detailed clarification to avoid any suspicion about the use of public funds.

S- Establishment of a Presidential Emergency Program for the Transition

In parallel with the PNDT, which should be really implemented from 2025, the President of the Transition should also develop his own vision through the Presidential Emergency Program of the Transition (PPUT). This program, with a bud-

Table. Evolution of Gabon's public debt under agreement.⁷¹

The government, in an effort to be transparent, has intensified communication on external debt management, with regular updates on compliance with

the Direction of the CTRI", CTRI. 17/06/2024. < <https://www.ctrigabon.com/actualite/99> >

71. Evolution of Gabon's public debt (Period September 2023 – May 2024. Ministry of the Economy and Shareholdings. 02/07/2024. < <https://www.ctrigabon.com/actualite/99> >

June 2024⁷³ highlights the persistent difficulties in controlling the country's debt and solvency in the short and medium term.

72. 2024 Article IV Consultation—Press Release, Staff Report, and Executive Director's Statement for Gabon. IMF Report No. 24/144. International Monetary Fund. July 2024. < <file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/2790-4458-002.2024.issue-144-fr.pdf> >

73. "Moody's downgrades Gabon's sovereign rating", Financial Afrik. 21/06/2024. < <https://www.financialafrik.com/2024/06/21/moodys-abaisse-la-note-souveraine-du-gabon/> >

74. "Gabon: the government is committed to making public mining, oil and forestry contracts", Initiative for Transparency in the Extractive Industries, Ministry of Economy and Finance. 12/07/2024. < <https://itiegabon.ga/2-actualites/4820-gabon-le-gouvernement-s-engage-a-rendre-public-les-contrats-miniers-petroliers-et-forestiers/> >

75. "Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema buys two VIP planes", Africa Intelligence. 28/08/2024. < <https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-centrale/2024/08/26/brice-clotaire-oligui-nguema-s-offre-deux-avions-vip.110279157-art> >

76. "Gabon: Oligui Nguema buys two new luxury planes", Gabon Review. 26/08/2024. < <https://www.gabonreview.com/gabon-oligui-nguema-sachete-deux-nouveaux-avions-luxueux/> >

77. "Gabon. Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema buys two VIP planes", Africa Intelligence. 26/08/2024. < <https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-centrale/2024/08/26/brice-clotaire-oligui-nguema-s-offre-deux-avions-vip.110279157-art> >

78. Sustainability in the end-of-life phase of aircraft. EASA. < <https://www.easa.europa.eu/fr/light/topics/sustainability-end-life-phase-aircraft#:~:text=Les%20a%C3%A9ronefs%20ont%20retir%C3%A9s%20de,pour%20les%20avions%20de%20fret.> >

get of 500 billion CFA francs⁷⁹, would be devoted to projects deemed priority by the Transitional authorities for the immediate development of the country.

Among the flagship projects of this program is the development and asphaltting of the Kougouleu-Medouneu-Equatorial Guinea border road axis, 168 km long, at an estimated cost of 201.6 billion CFA francs. In addition, there is the infrastructure project on the 260 km line between Makokou-Mekambo-Ekata, planned over a period of 4 years, at a cost of 253 billion CFA francs.⁸⁰ The implementation of these road infrastructure projects could have a major impact on Gabon's socio-economic development, by facilitating travel and stimulating local economic activities.

While the need to develop road infrastructure appears to be a vital emergency, some elements of the PPUT raise questions. The announcement of this program in August 2024 seems to create a form of two-headedness within the state, with two distinct visions of development: on the one hand, the PNDDT, validated by the government and the organs of the Transition, and on the other hand, the PPUT, which seems to be settling outside the officially established program. This discrepancy could create tensions on the coherence of the priorities of the State in Transition.

In addition, the financing mechanisms for the PPUP are not yet clearly defined, which could lead

79. "Gabon: nearly 500 billion for the implementation of the presidential emergency program of the transition", Gabon Media Time. 20/08/2024. < <https://gabonmediatime.com/gabon-pres-de-500-milliards-pour-la-mise-en-oeuvre-du-programme-presidentiel-durgence-de-la-transition/> >

80. "Gabon: the two priority projects of the Presidential Emergency Program of the Transition estimated at about 842 million USD (about 500 billion FCFA)", Invest time. 21/08/2024. < <https://invest-time.com/2024/08/21/gabon-les-deux-projets-prioritaires-du-programme-presidentiel-durgence-de-la-transition-chiffre-a-environ-842-millions-usd-environ-500-milliards-fcfa/> >

to reluctance among donors, especially in view of the country's current level of debt. Finally, the duration of some projects included in this program seems to be moving away from the timeline of the Transition, which should last 2 years and mark a return to constitutional order, with a transfer of power to civilians.

ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION

Economic governance is undeniably one of the main indicators of the Transition's performance, because the restoration of Gabon depends above all on a solid revival of its economy. Indeed, if economic management was one of the major weaknesses of the deposed regime of Ali Bongo Ondimba, it is almost obvious that the socio-economic balance of the Transition will be a determining factor in the reconfiguration of the political and economic landscape of the new Gabon.

These projects, certainly bring hope for the Gabonese population, aim to meet urgent development needs and offer new opportunities. Moreover, this mixed economic record on the macro-economic level according to international rating agencies but considered rather satisfactory by a large part of the population constitutes the major argument of the President of the Transition as a candidate for the presidential election of April 12, 2025.



Source : jeuneafrique.com

| SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

If there is one institution whose dysfunctions have marked the 14 years of Ali Bongo Ondimba's reign, it is justice. In Gabon, this institution has been instrumentalized, not to guarantee the fundamental rights of citizens, but to repress any form of dissent. Through the promulgation of repressive laws and the systematic violation of international treaties on civil, political and economic rights ratified by Gabon, justice has lost its primary vocation and has become a tool of control and oppression.

Under the era of Ali Bongo Ondimba, justice was used as a weapon of ruthless repression against public freedoms. Gabon has undergone no less than 9 revisions of the Constitution since 1991⁸¹, largely intended to maintain the power in place.⁸² and certainly more violations of the Constitution during these 14 years than during the 42 years of Omar Bongo Ondimba's reign. The judicial system, far from guaranteeing fairness, has made it possible to maintain an authoritarian system where judicial decisions were often made according to the interests of the power in place.

The handling of some cases—including those related to embezzlement of public funds, human rights violations, and blood crimes—has blatantly exposed the shortcomings and failures of this institution. Cases of corruption and abuse of power were often covered up, and those responsible went unpunished, which seriously tarnished the image of justice.

For example, between October 2009 and August 2023, no less than 7 waivers of parliamentary immunity were noted by TLP-Gabon, all targeted at personalities in opposition or who had fallen out of favor with the BONGO regime. These steps were a way of muzzling the political opposition and reinforcing a climate of repression within Gabonese institutions.

81. "Constitutions and constitutional revisions", LegiGabon. Accessed on 03/03/2025. <<https://www.legigabon.com/constitutions-et-revisions>>
82. "Constitutional coups d'état promote military coups", Institute for Security Studies. 24/10/2023. <<https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/les-coups-detat-constitutionnels-favorisent-les-coups-detat-militaires>>

For all these known and anonymous victims of the BONGO regime's judicial iniquity, the coup d'état of August 30, 2023 perpetrated by the CTRI was a real moment of deliverance.

| EFFECTIVE MEASURES

As an institution at the very foundation of the rule of law, justice is the basis of the administrative and institutional functioning of the country. It is in this respect that the CTRI has taken the following measures:

- A. House arrest and imprisonment of some members of the deposed regime - as of 30 August 2023
- B. Appointment of new Constitutional Judges - September 2023
- C. Organization of the Justice Symposium - November 2023
- D. Justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commission - April 2024
- E. Trial for embezzlement of public funds - May 2024
- F. Translation of eight magistrates into disciplinary council - July 2024

| EXAMINATION AND OBSERVATIONS ON MY EFFECTIVE MEASURES

A- House arrest and incarceration of some members of the deposed regime

The coup d'état of 30 August 2023 was marked by the placement under house arrest and incarceration of some members of the deposed regime. House arrest, provided for in article 143 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is an alternative measure to incarceration that requires a person to remain within a specific perimeter, often restricted to his or her home, and strictly limits his or her freedom of movement. In this case, this measure was seen as transitory, announcing legal proceedings for, among other things, acts of high treason, embezzlement of public funds, and forgery and use of forgery, as specified in the coup d'état communiqué n°002.⁸³

83. CTRI press release N°002. Presidency of the Gabonese Republic. 30/08/2023. <<https://presidence.ga/2023/08/30/communiqué-du-ctri-n002/>>

This measure has caused more frustration than satisfaction, not least because it seems inconceivable that officials who have actively participated in rigging the elections, responsible for violent protests and bloody repression, should be placed under house arrest rather than imprisoned. In addition, the disparity in treatment between incarcerated and house arrest personalities has fuelled many questions. No clear explanation has been provided as to why some members of the ousted regime have been imprisoned while others have been allowed to leave the country, such as the former Minister of Water and Forests, Lee White, or placed under house arrest. This inequality can be perceived as a mixture of complacency and settling of scores, which discredits the CTRI authorities and compromises the image of justice in the context of the Transition, which is supposed to be fair, exemplary and impartial.

Finally, the presence of the former president of the Gabonese Elections Center (CGE), Michel Stéphane BONDA, directly involved in the publication of the fraudulent results during the August 26, 2023 elections, among the officials during the tour of the President of the Transition in the province of Ogooué Lolo, on May 10, 2025, provoked anger and indignation⁸⁴. This situation raises crucial

84. "Gabon: Michel Stéphane Bonda: strange controversy against a silent victim of the fallen

questions about the credibility and justification of the measures taken by the CTRI, particularly with regard to the fairness of judicial treatment in a transitional context.

B- Appointment of new constitutional judges

The replacement of the president of the former Constitutional Court, Marie Madeleine MBORANTSUO, after 32 years of uninterrupted presidency⁸⁵, represents the first major symbolic act of the restoration of institutions in Gabon. This decision marks the end of a contested presidency that is perceived as complicit in electoral fraud, thus sending a strong signal to the Gabonese people. Indeed, the former Constitutional Court has long been criticized for its validation of the fraudulent electoral results, which have characterized the last presidential elections since its establishment in 1991.

regime", Gabon Minutes. 12/05/2024. <<https://gabonminutes.com/gabon-michel-stephane-bonda-etrange-polemique-contre-une-victime-silencieuse-du-regime-dechu/>>
85. "Gabon: end of reign for the president of the Constitutional Court", RFI. 07/09/2023. <<https://www.gabonreview.com/bourses-impayees-lanbg-pousse-les-etudiants-vers-labandon/#:~:text=Since%20plusieurs%20mois%2C%20l'Agence,boursiers%20dans%20une%20situation%20critique.>>



Source : elliitorial.com

The fact that Ms. MBORANTSUO was appointed president of this institution from its inception in 1991 until the 2023 coup is a testament to the longevity of her hold on the country's judiciary. His immovable position has, in large part, contributed to the perception of the institution as an instrument for legitimizing electoral fraud, which has sullied the credibility of Gabon's electoral processes.

The replacement of this emblematic figure and the installation of a new presidency at the Constitutional Court of the Transition can therefore be perceived as a gesture of rupture.

However, this approach is not without ambiguity. While the renewal of the elites initiated by the CTRI seems to bring a wind of change, the retention of three judges from the former Constitutional Court and the appointment of a new president, Dieudonné ABA'A OYONO, with supposed family links with the head of the CTRI raise questions.⁸⁶ Indeed, although these changes may be seen as a desire to restructure the institution, some observers fear that they will compromise the independence of the Court.

In addition, the nine judges of the Court were personally appointed by Brice Clotaire Oligui NGUEMA without including the various state institutions in the choice of appointments. Also, despite her eviction from the Constitutional Court in September 2023, Marie-Madeleine MBORANTSUO was appointed by decree of the President of the Transition as honorary "honorary president" of the Court, a position that involves many advantages, which has generated popular anger. The Gabonese government justified itself by retorting that there was nothing illegal and that this function was provided for by the texts.

These events raise questions and the risk of maintaining practices inherited from the past remains, and the perception of political continuity could harm the hopes of rupture that this new composition is supposed to embody.

B- Organization of the Justice Symposium

In its drive to restore institutions, the CTRI, through the Ministry of Justice, organized in November 2023 the First Symposium on the Reform of the Judicial System, also known as the First Annual

86. "The networks of the powerful president of the Constitutional Court, Dieudonné Aba'a Owono", Africa Intelligence. 10/05/2024. < <https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-centrale/2024/05/10/les-reseaux-du-puissant-president-de-la-cour-constitutionnelle-dieudonne-aba-a-owono,110223752-ar2> >

Convention of the Judicial System.⁸⁷ The objective of this meeting was to draw up an objective diagnosis of the current state of the Gabonese judicial system and to highlight the evils that plague justice, in order to participate in the development of the Transition Strategy for the Reform of the Judicial System.

This work, which took place from Tuesday, November 21 to 24, 2023, marks a turning point in the process of reforming the Gabonese judicial system, by providing concrete solutions to the challenges faced by the justice system. The implementation of the recommendations resulting from this work is essential for sustainable transformation of the system.

C- Justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission remains one of the great expectations of the Gabonese people, mentioned during the first hearings between the nation's living forces and the CTRI, on the eve of the announcement of the Inclusive National Dialogue (DNI). This commission represents a real hope of reparation for the victims of the years of governance of the fallen regime, and could be an act of healing in the face of the deep wounds left by the power of Ali Bongo Ondimba. The fact that the CTRI did not categorically refuse this request feeds the hope of a true national reconciliation.

However, the absence of this commission among the concrete measures announced in the framework of the DNI has caused great disappointment and misunderstanding. Many observers considered that the DNI, a process that was supposed to bring together all the country's vital forces, represented the ideal opportunity to officially launch this initiative. During the opening ceremony of the DNI on April 2, 2024, the CTRI said that it reserved the right, when the time came, to set up this truth, justice and reconciliation commission, without specifying the date or the precise contours⁸⁸.

87. "Gabon: Judicial Reform at Play," Gabon Review. 21/11/2023. < <https://www.gabonreview.com/gabon-la-reforme-du-systeme-judiciaire-en-jeu/> >

88. "National dialogue: the CTRI does not rule out the idea of setting up a truth, justice and reconciliation commission!", Gabon Media Time. 05/04/2024. < <https://gabonmediatime.com/dialogue-national-le-ctri-necarte-pas-lidee-de-la-mise-en-place-dune-commission-verite-justice-et-reconciliation/> >

D- Trial for embezzlement of public funds

The verdict handed down on May 25, 2024 by the specialized criminal court, in the trial of Ali Bongo Ondimba's former chief of staff, Brice Laccruche Alihanga, and his acolytes, has generated many questions and general indignation. This highly anticipated trial followed the Scorpion anti-corruption operation, launched in 2019, which aimed to dismantle a network of embezzlement of public funds, with amounts estimated at several tens of billions of CFA francs.⁸⁹ The investigation had revealed suspicions of political score-settling, particularly on the role of public administration executives and personalities close to President Ali Bongo Ondimba during the period of power vacuum due to his stroke, between October 2018 and the end of 2019.

Although the defendants admitted their guilt, the verdict surprised many. Indeed, despite the serious accusations, all the defendants were released, with relatively lenient sentences: Brice LACCRUCHE ALIHANGA was sentenced to 12 years in prison, including 3 years, 10 months and 16 days in prison, having already spent four years in pre-trial detention, he was released with a fine of 5 billion CFA francs and 100 million CFA francs. Former minister Tony ONDO MBA is sentenced to 10 years in prison, including 4 years, 5 months and 10 days in prison, so he regains his freedom after 4 years behind bars. He was also fined 1.8 billion CFA francs in damages and a fine of 100 million CFA francs. In addition, his building in Libreville and several bank accounts were seized.

E- Translation of eight magistrates into disciplinary council

On Monday, July 22, 2024, eight magistrates, first and second grade, including two members of the family of the ousted President, were brought before the Disciplinary Council of the Superior Council of the Judiciary.⁹⁰ Although the precise reasons for this translation into the disciplinary council have not been communicated, these magistrates are accused of reprehensible behavior contrary to the ethics and deontology of their

89. "Gabon, a controversial anti-corruption 'Scorpion'", Deutsche Welle. 09/12/2019. < <https://www.dw.com/fr/gabon-un-scorpion-anticorruption-controvers%C3%A9/a-51584648> >

90. "Magistrature: Linda Bongo, Audrey Bongo, Rebecca Oboumadjogo and Co. Translated into Disciplinary Councils", Gabon Media Time. 22/07/2024. < <https://gabonmediatime.com/magistrature-linda-bongoaudrey-bongo-rebecca-oboumadjogo-et-cie-traduits-en-conseil-de-discipline/> >

office, among them Linda Pauline Epigat BONGO ONDIMBA and Audrey Balkisso BONGO ONDIMBA criticized for having worn the colors of the PDG and having publicly supported Ali BONGO in the last presidential election.

This is a strong signal of the CTRI's desire to restore probity and integrity within the judicial system, after years of neglect in which some magistrates escaped any form of sanction despite unethical acts.

It is imperative that additional efforts be made to inform public opinion about the deviant actions and behaviors of these magistrates, in order to maintain the confidence of the people in the reforms undertaken. In addition, transparency should become the norm. Judges, in a process of renewing confidence, should be required to declare their assets, thus guaranteeing their probity and consolidating the legitimacy of reforms.

ASSESSMENT OF JUSTICE IN TRANSITION

At the end of these first 18 months of Transition, particular attention was paid to improving the quality of the Gabonese judicial system. Although progress has been made, it is essential that strict respect for the law and the independence of the judiciary be fully guaranteed. This would restore the image of this institution, which is essential to the success of the Transition. Justice, as a fundamental pillar of the State, plays a decisive role in the legitimacy of the actions undertaken and in the restoration of citizens' trust. His contribution to the Transition process, in particular through his impartiality and his ability to judge without political influence, will be crucial for the renewal of Gabon.

Source : directinfosgabon.com



HUMAN RIGHTS

| SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

The presidential election of August 2009 marked a tragic turning point for Gabon, plunging the country into an unprecedented cycle of political violence and human rights violations. For the first time in its history, the country was the scene of post-election violence accompanied by an ICC preliminary examination mission, respectively in 2016.⁹¹ Although this examination did not lead to the opening of investigations, the ICC Prosecutor clarifies that the absence of an investigation “*cannot in any case mask the seriousness of the acts of violence and human rights violations that appear to have been committed in Gabon*”.⁹² It bears witness to a climate marked by serious and long-term abuses. The issue of the lack of documentation of the post-election violence of 2016 was highlighted by ACAT-France.⁹³

It is in this context of repression of fundamental rights and freedoms that the military coup of August 30, 2023 took place, which, although promising change, stems from the failure of the political system in place to meet the aspirations of justice and dignity of the Gabonese people.

| EFFECTIVE MEASURES

- A.** Glenn Patrick MOUNDENDE case - July 2023;
- B.** Release of political detainees - September 2023;
- C.** Establishment of a military curfew - August 2023;
- D.** Return of political exiles - September 2023;
- E.** Arrest of SEEG trade unionists - December 2023
- F.** Adoption of a decree authorizing senior army officials to take several wives - January 2024;
- G.** Kidnapping of the leaders of CONASYSED and Unitary Dynamics - March 2024;

91. Preliminary examination, Gabon – ICC-01/16. International Criminal Court. < <https://www.icc-cpi.int/fr/node/192312> >

92. “The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on the situation in the Gabonese Republic: ‘the legal conditions justifying the opening of an investigation are not met’”, International Criminal Court. 21/09/2018. < <https://www.icc-cpi.int/fr/news/le-procureur-de-la-cour-penale-internationale-propos-de-la-situation-en-republique-gabonaise> >

93. “How the ICC was instrumentalized by the Bongo regime,” Afrique XXI. 06/09/2023. < <https://afriquexxi.info/Comment-la-CPI-a-ete-instrumentalisee-par-le-regime-Bongo> >

- H.** Improvement of living conditions in prisons - April and May 2024;
- I.** Arrest and torture of Hans OTOUNGA OBAME - June 2024;
- J.** Extradition of Cameroonian activist Steve AKAM alias “Ramon Cotta” - July 2024;
- K.** Compensation for victims of financial scams (Poste Bank) - December 2024

| REVIEWS AND OBSERVATIONS

A- Glenn Patrick MOUNDENDE case

The assassination by Gabonese security forces in obscure circumstances of Glenn Patrick MOUNDENDE⁹⁴, a 34-year-old man who denounced the marginalization of indigenous populations in the department of Mandji-Ndoulou (South Gabon) by oil companies in July 2023, has deeply shocked public opinion. He took three employees of an oil company hostage to make his demands heard. The official version of the authorities, which emphasizes the fact that MOUNDENDE would have raped one of the hostages and was armed during the assassination against SDF agents, has not convinced, and in the first place the family of the victim.⁹⁵

The SDF assault took place during the night, around 1:30 a.m., freeing the hostages. The kidnapper, however, could not be neutralized and fled. After a few hours, he was located near the Coucal de Perenco site, where another employee was taken hostage.

While on the run, Glen MOUNDENDE had recorded a video with his phone in which he peacefully justified his act and specified the circumstances of the hostages’ release, citing self-defense. A few hours before his assassination, this video was published on social networks, causing a shock, as it seemed obvious that the fugitive was ready to negotiate his surrender. A complaint against X was filed by his family with the prosecutor of Mouila on August 13, 2023.⁹⁶

94. “Assassination of Glenn-Patrick Moundendé: Maganga Moussavou accuses Ali Bongo”, Gabon Media Time. 24/07/2023. < <https://gabonmediatime.com/assassinat-de-glenn-patrick-moundende-maganga-moussavou-accuse-ali-bongo/> >

95. “The Glenn Moundendé Case: Grey Areas, Old Claims and the Dream of Reconciliation,” Gabon Review. 28/07/2023. < <https://www.gabonreview.com/affaire-glenn-moundende-zones-dombre-vieilles-revendications-et-reves-meurtris/> >

96. “Glenn Moundendé Case: A Crucial Test

In his statements, Glenn MOUNDENDE denounced the lack of opportunities for local populations, in particular the lack of recruitment and basic social investments (roads, electricity, health centers, schools, drinking water). He denounced the exploitation of oil operators who, despite their considerable profits, flout the laws on benefits in favor of local communities, with the complicity of local authorities.

As the deposed regime refused to return the body to the family, it was not until November that Glenn MOUNDENDE’s body was returned and the funeral could take place on November 17, 2024.⁹⁷ However, the investigation to establish responsibility for this tragedy seems to have stalled and leaves a feeling of incompleteness. Those involved in the murder must be prosecuted. To date, no action has been taken on the complaint filed by his family in August 2023.

B- Release of political prisoners

One of the most significant decisions after the coup was the release of political prisoners, a symbolic act that resonated deeply with public opinion. These waves of liberation were perceived as the end of Ali Bongo Ondimba’s system and its string of injustices. Among the personalities, Jean-Rémy YAMA, a member of TLP-Gabon, and the former mayor of Libreville, Léandre ZUE, released in September 2023, found themselves at the forefront, embodying political resistance in the face of repression. As of April 1, 2024, the presidential pardon has allowed 1166 prisoners to benefit from either partial remission of sentence or full release.⁹⁸

This decision not only symbolized the break with the fallen regime, it was also a gesture of reconciliation on the part of the military with the Gabonese people. By giving back to citizens freedoms lost under decades of authoritarian rule, the CTIRI wanted to offer a new beginning, bringing hope for a true democratization of the country.

for Gabon’s New Judicial Era,” Gabon Review. 07/08/2023. < <https://www.gabonreview.com/affaire-glenn-moundende-un-test-crucial-pour-la-nouvelle-ere-judiciaire-au-gabon/> >

97. “05 months after his execution for hostage-taking, Glen Patrick Moundendé will finally be buried in Mandji,” Gabonactu.com. 16/11/2023. < <https://gabonactu.com/blog/2023/11/16/05-mois-apres-son-execution-pour-priise-dotages-glen-patrick-moundende-sera-enfin-inhume-a-mandji/> >

98. “Presidential pardon: 1,166 convicts beneficiaries in all prisons,” Gabon Review. 02/04/2024. < <https://www.gabonreview.com/grace-presidentielle-1-166-condamnes-beneficiaires-dans-lensemble-des-prisons/> >

Although widely welcomed by the population, this measure quickly raised questions, particularly about the profile of some of the released prisoners and the selection process for these releases. These choices have not been accompanied by clear explanations concerning the monitoring of judicial procedures and their compliance. In addition, the continued detention of certain personalities, such as Kelly Ondo OBIANG, considered to be political prisoners, raises doubts about the fairness of the measure. Today, part of the public is wondering about the case of Lieutenant Kelly ONDO OBIANG and his military colleagues, accused of having participated in the abortive coup attempt of January 9, 2019,⁹⁹ and who are still incarcerated, despite the fact that the army has taken power.

C- Establishment of a military curfew

After three years of curfew imposed due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the CTIRI has decreed a new curfew in order to prevent possible unrest and to prevent certain personalities incriminated in economic crimes from leaving the territory illegally. This measure was also intended to guarantee the safety of people and property, with the aim of avoiding acts of looting.¹⁰⁰

In the aftermath of the coup, the curfew was initially introduced between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. on the country’s main roads, and from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. in certain areas of Greater Libreville. Subsequently, it was gradually rearranged, going from 24 hours to 5 hours, then from 2 hours to 5 hours, then from 24 hours to 5 hours for the vote by referendum on the new Constitution. The curfew will finally be lifted on December 18, 2024¹⁰¹. This lifting comes after yet another blunder involving some elements of the SDF who allegedly inflicted degrading treat-

99. “Gabon: the alleged perpetrators of a failed putsch accuse a brother of President Bongo”, Le Monde. 25/06/2021. < https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2021/06/25/gabon-les-auteurs-presumes-d-un-putsch-rate-accusent-un-frere-du-president-bongo_6085628_3212.html >

100. “The curfew in Gabon, between security and frustration”, Gabonews. 19/12/2024. < <https://www.gabonews.com/fr/actus/chroniques/article/le-couvre-feu-au-gabon-entre-securite-et> >

101. “Gabon: curfew introduced after August 2023 coup d’état lifted ‘until further notice’”, Rfi. Published on 19/12/2024. < <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241219-gabon-lev%C3%A9e-couvre-feu-instaur%C3%A9-apr%C3%A8s-le-coup-%C3%A9tat-ao%C3%BBt-2023> >

102 “Curfew violation and arrests: the National Gendarmerie accused of alleged human rights violations”, Top infos Gabon. 17/12/2024. < <https://topinfosgabon.com/articles/violation-du-couvre-feu-et-interpellations-la-gendarmerie-nationale-accusee-d-atteintes-presumees-aux-droits-humains> >

ment, including forced shaving of the head¹⁰², on people arrested on the night of December 13 to 14, including 145 for violating the curfew.

Despite the arguments put forward to justify this measure, several incidents took place at those who did not respect the curfew hours: the arrested men had their heads shaved, provoking indignation.¹⁰³ Also, two cases of fatal blunders marked this period, in particular: the death of Karl Stécy AKUE ANGOUE, a 30-year-old young man, beaten to death for violating the curfew on the night of October 12 to 13, 2023. During this incident, several people were beaten.¹⁰⁴ Lionel ROKEWA, another 25-year-old, also died on December 18, 2023 in Port-Gentil for violating the curfew.¹⁰⁵ Although investigations have been opened and legal proceedings launched, these blunders raise serious questions about the behavioral abuses observed by certain elements of the Defense and Security Forces (FDS). In addition, 6 months after the announcement of the opening of an investigation in the case of Lionel ROKEWA, no progress has been communicated on the case. During the Transition period, this violence against civilians between the defense forces raised the question of discipline within the security forces and respect for human rights and was the subject of an appeal by Brice Oligui NGUEMA to his men, asking for exemplarity.¹⁰⁶

D-Return of political exiles

During the fourteen years of Ali Bongo Ondimba's reign, many Gabonese were forced into exile, while others, living abroad, were prevented from return-

102. "Gabon: curfew introduced after August 2023 coup d'état lifted 'until further notice'", Rfi. Published on 19/12/2024. <<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241219-gabon-lev%C3%A9e-couvre-feu-instaur%C3%A9-apr%C3%A8s-le-coup-%C3%A9tat-ao%C3%BBt-2023>>
103. "'We're learning to live again': with the end of the curfew, the Gabonese are enjoying the night again", RFI. 22/12/2024. <<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241222-on-r%C3%A9apprend-%C3%A0-vivre-avec-la-fin-du-couvre-feu-les-gabonais-profitent-%C3%A0-nouveau-de-la-nuit>>
104. "In Gabon, a possible military blunder arouses emotion", RFI. 07/11/2023. <<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20231107-au-gabon-une-possible-bavure-militaire-suscite-l-%C3%A9motion>>
105. "Death of Lionel Rokewa: the Port-Gentil Public Prosecutor's Office opens an investigation", Gabonactu.com. 19/12/2023. <<https://gabonactu.com/blog/2023/12/19/deces-de-lionel-rokewa-le-parquet-de-port-gentil-ouvre-une-enquete/>>
106. "Gabon: the transitional president calls on the military to be exemplary, after accusations of violence", RFI. 05/01/2024. <<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240105-gabon-le-pr%C3%A9sident-de-transition-r%C3%A9clame-aux-militaires-d-%C3%AAtre-exemplaires-apr%C3%A8s-des-accusations-de-violences>>

ing. The climate of repression, affecting both political opponents and ordinary citizens, has created a political diaspora marked by forced exiles and lives suspended in uncertainty.

The Transition initiated by the CTRI marked an important turning point by making the return of political exiles a priority, with the appointment of several personalities living until then in exile, in government institutions and within the high ranks of the Transition such as Séraphin MOUNDOUNGA, Mays MOUISSI and even more recently Alfred NGUIA BANDA. This symbolic gesture marked the return of political exiles, allowing them to resume an active place in the political and institutional life of the country.

However, this measure seems to have been accompanied by a political deal, which makes it difficult to objectively assess his sincerity. In addition, despite the outstretched hand of the new authorities, some exiles, especially activists who denounce the abuses observed during this period of Transition, are reluctant to return. The fear of repercussions for criticizing the CTRI in the current context has led some to adopt an attitude of self-censorship.

Finally, the legal proceedings recently initiated against two famous activists, Landry AMIANG and Stéphane ZENG, who accepted the CTRI's proposal to return to the country, for defamation dating back to the era of Ali Bongo Ondimba, raise questions about the true scope of the desire for reconciliation.¹⁰⁷

E- Arrest of SEEG trade unionists

On December 11, 2023, while they had filed a strike notice to demand the payment of their thirteenth-month bonus, eight trade unionists from the Gabonese Water and Energy Company (SEEG) were arrested¹⁰⁸ by the General Directorate of Counter-Interference and Military Security (DGCISM). The reasons for the arrest appear to be related to the union's threat to suspend the supply of water and electricity in Libreville and other parts of the country.

Initially, public opinion, already exasperated by the untimely electricity and water cuts, did not

107. "Stéphane Zeng and Landry Washington... from Facebook to arrest warrants", Gabon Review. 8/08/2024. <<https://www.gabonreview.com/stephane-zeng-et-landry-washington-de-facebook-aux-mandats-darret/>>
108. "Gabon: release of eight trade unionists detained by military intelligence", RFI. 15/12/2023. <<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20231215-gabon-lib%C3%A9ration-de-huit-syndicalistes-d%C3%A9tenu-par-les-renseignements-militaires>>

express much solidarity with the trade unionists. Many felt that the claim for payment of the premium was not justified, given the poor quality of service provided. However, the threat to cut off the water supply, especially during the sensitive holiday season, angered the CTRI and alienated part of the population from trade unionists.

After three days of detention, the eight trade unionists, including two women, were released, bearing the scars of physical abuse: their heads had been shaved, an unprecedented and shocking practice in Gabonese customs.¹⁰⁹ This measure sparked a wave of outrage, as it was perceived as a flagrant violation of trade union freedoms and human rights. It was like an attempt at intimidation and an attack on human dignity, calling into question the respect of fundamental rights under the Transition.

F- Adoption of an Order in Council Authorizing General Officers and Superiors to Take Multiple Wives

The revision of Ordinance No. 007/PR/2010 of 25 February 2010 on the Special Status of the Military¹¹⁰, modifying the rules governing marriage within the Security Forces, has raised questions about its appropriateness and its impact on gender equality. Adopted on January 22, 2024, this reform introduces an exception to the monogamous regime initially imposed on the military by authorizing, through the new article 40, general officers and superiors to contract a polygamous marriage¹¹¹.

This provision appears to be a tailor-made law, granting a privilege to a limited category of the army, without consideration for senior female officers, whose right to a polyandrous union is neither mentioned nor culturally considered. It also raises concerns about its impact on women's rights, while polygamy, although practiced in some regions, has

109. "Gabon, eight trade unionists brutalized by military intelligence", Mondafrique. 14/12/2023. <<https://mondafrique.com/politique/gabon-8-syndicalistes-dont-deux-femmes-brutalises-et-humilies-par-les-renseignements-militaires/>>
110. "Gabon: Polygamy soon recognized for general and superior officers", Gabon Media Time. 23/01/2024. <<https://gabonmediatime.com/gabon-la-polygamie-bientot-reconnue-aux-officiers-generaux-et-superieurs/>>
111. Official Journal No. 9 bis of 5 March 2024. 23/01/2024. <<chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://droit-et-politique-en-afrique.info/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Ordonnance-du-23-janvier-2024-autorisant-le-mariage-polygamique-des-militaires.pdf>>

not previously been so selectively framed in military legislation.

The context of this amendment has fuelled the debates all the more because barely three months after its adoption, on 27 April 2024, the President of the Transition, Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, made his second marriage official¹¹², reinforcing suspicions of a legislative amendment designed for personal gain.

G- Kidnapping of the leaders of CONASYSED and Unitary Dynamics

On March 1, 2024, the worrying disappearance of the two trade union leaders Alain MANGOUADI and Thierry NKOULOU, following their audience with the Minister of Public Service, caused a shock-wave in the country.¹¹³ The two leaders of powerful unions in the education sector were supposed to lead a large union rally on March 2. Their disappearance has fuelled speculation, with many seeing it as a direct link to their demands for the regularisation of civil servants' administrative positions, promised by the government. This disappearance has fuelled fears of repression linked to a possible strike movement in the education sector, a particularly sensitive area where trade unionists have frequently been the target of intimidation and arbitrary arrests under the regime of Ali Bongo.

No official reason has been given for the abduction, which has heightened concern around the case. Suspicions then emerged regarding the involvement of elements linked to the defence and security forces in this act. After their release on the night of March 3, 2024, the Dynamique Unitaire union claims that they were kidnapped by soldiers from the General Directorate of Counter-Intelligence and Military Security¹¹⁴. No official investigation has been launched to identify and prosecute those responsible for the abduction in broad daylight.

112. "Gabon, Brice Oligui Nguema married his second wife", Mondafrique. Published on 03/05/2024. <<https://mondafrique.com/a-la-une/gabon-brice-oliqui-nguema-a-epouse-sa-deuxieme-femme/>>
113. "Worrying disappearance of two eminent members of Dynamique Unitaire: where are Alain Mouagouadi and Thierry Nkoulou?" Gabon Review. 02/03/2024. <<https://www.gabonreview.com/disparition-inquietante-de-deux-membres-eminents-de-dynamique-unitaire-ou-sont-alain-mouagouadi-et-thierry-nkoulou/>>
114. "Kidnapping of Dynamique unitaire trade unionists: the B2 accused of an illegal abduction," Gabon Review. 03/03/2024. <<https://www.gabonreview.com/kidnapping-de-syndicalistes-de-dynamique-unitaire-le-b2-accuse-dun-rapt-illegal/>>

H- Improving living conditions in prisons

The central prison of Libreville, built in 1954 by the French colonial administration, had been facing problems for several years with dilapidated buildings, prison overcrowding (in 2022, it contained about 4000 prisoners for a capacity of 500 people)¹¹⁵ and poor hygiene conditions. In 2021, it was revealed that inmates at Libreville prison empty septic tanks with buckets of water and without any protection.¹¹⁶ Overall, prisoners have limited access to food, light, clean water, sanitation facilities and exercise areas. In 2022, the NGO SOS Prisoners recorded 4 deaths in prisons due to the lack of medical care. These shortcomings are particularly visible in the treatment of the personalities of the deposed regime, who have been imprisoned since the coup d'état of August 30, 2023. In 2024, the UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture visited Gabon and found “little progress in the fight against overcrowding” since the last visit in 2013, describing detention conditions as “deplorable” and “horrific”.¹¹⁷

However, under the impetus of the CTRI, improvements have been implemented to address concerns related to the conditions of detention and to reassure both national and international opinion.

This progress has resulted in several significant actions:

- The inauguration of a human rights house at the central prison of Libreville. This space is dedicated to the promotion of fundamental rights and the handling of prisoners' complaints. Within the building, there is a bakery and a tea room that not only improves the conditions of the inmates, but also promotes their professional reintegration.¹¹⁸

115. 2023 Human Rights Report – Gabon. U.S. Department of State. < <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/gabon/> >
116. “Libreville Central Prison: Inmates Empty Septic Tanks with Buckets of Water,” Gabon Review. 13/07/2021. < <https://www.gabonreview.com/prison-centrale-de-libreville-les-detenus-vidangent-les-fosses-septiques-avec-des-seaux-deau/> >
117. “Gabon: Little progress in the fight against overcrowding and deplorable detention conditions, according to UN experts”, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. < <https://www.ohchr.org/fr/press-releases/2024/03/gabon-little-progress-addressing-overcrowding-and-deplorable-detention> >
118. “Gabon: A House of Human Rights and Much More for the Central Prison of Libreville”, Gabon Review. 10/05/2024. < <https://www.gabonreview.com/gabon-une-maison-des-droits-de-lhomme-et-bien-plus-pour-la-prison-centrale-de-libreville/> >

- The decision to release a thousand prisoners from Gabon’s prisons through a presidential pardon in April 2024¹¹⁹, an act that helped to relieve congestion in the prison while marking a strong gesture towards national reconciliation.

Despite this, fundamental problems remain in terms of the incarceration of remand prisoners in violation of the time limits for pre-trial detention, food for detainees and access to health care.

I- Arrest and torture of Hans OTOUNGA OBAME

On June 15, 2024, the brother of activist Thibaut ADJATYS residing in France, Hans OTOUNGA OBAME, was kidnapped and tortured by a commando.¹²⁰ An audio testimony about the torture he allegedly suffered during the 14 days in detention was published, and he exposed the evidence of these abuses through photos published on the web, according to him that it was Brice Oligui NGUEMA’s brother who commanded his torturers, being a lieutenant colonel in the Republican Guard. Following this testimony, he was incarcerated in the central prison of Libreville on July 3, 2024. On 8 July, he appeared before the Criminal Court of Libreville, prosecuted by the Public Prosecutor’s Office for disseminating false information.

Although he was acquitted by the court on July 29, 2024, this decision raises crucial questions about the conditions of detention of people in police custody in Gabon. The acquittal of Hans OTOUNGA is a disavowal of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which has failed to prove the charges against him. This verdict is a strong signal that the justice system must now use this decision to prosecute those responsible for the acts of torture, so that the physical and moral damage suffered by the victim is duly compensated.

J- Extradition of Cameroonian activist Steve AKAM alias “Ramon Cotta”.

Missing and wanted by his relatives since July 19, 2024, Cameroonian activist Steeve AKAM, who has been living in Gabon for more than 12 years, appeared in a viral video, handcuffed and surrounded by members of the Cameroonian police

119. “Gabon: 99 detainees released in Port-Gentil out of the 1000 pardoned by Oligui Nguema”, Gabon Actu. Published on 03/04/2024. < <https://gabonactu.com/blog/2024/04/03/gabon-99-detenus-liberes-a-port-gentil-sur-les-1000-gracies-par-le-oligui-nguema/> >
120. “Gabon, Hans Otounga Obame kidnapped and tortured”, Mondafrrique. 07/08/2024. < <https://mondafrique.com/confidentiels/gabon-hans-otounga-obame-enleve-et-torture/> >

at a border post between Gabon and Cameroon. In this video, visibly coerced by his kidnappers, he asks for forgiveness from Cameroonian President Paul BIYA, whom he had virulently criticized on social networks. Subsequently, he was handed over to the Cameroonian authorities.

The abduction of Steeve AKAM appears to have been motivated by extradition proceedings between Cameroon and Gabon, although the Gabonese authorities have not provided any official explanation for the abduction. In August, his lawyer said he is being held at the Central Judicial Research Service in Yaoundé.¹²¹ Moreover, the methods used to carry out this extradition clearly violate Articles 16 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Gabon ratified in 1983. These articles stipulate that every individual has the right to recognition everywhere of his or her legal personality and that “no one shall be interfered with for his or her opinions”.¹²²

K- Compensation for victims of financial scams (Poste Bank)

In the last quarter of 2017, several thousand savers of the Post Bank found themselves deprived of their savings following embezzlement orchestrated by personalities close to the power of Ali Bongo Ondimba. By committing to reimburse the victims of the suspicious bankruptcy of this state bank¹²³, the CTRI wanted to restore the rights of citizens and give back to the state some of its dignity, whereas the latter had struggled until then to give a favourable response to the multiple demands of disillusioned savers.

121. “Cameroonian influencer Ramon Cotta detained in Yaoundé”, VOA. 21/08/2024. < <https://www.voaafrrique.com/a/cameroun-l-influenceur-ramon-cotta-d%C3%A9tenu-%C3%A0-yaound%C3%A9/7751201.html> >
122. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 16/12/66. < <https://www.ohchr.org/fr/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights> >
123. “La Poste Bank savers soon reimbursed”, TV+ Afrique. 27/12/2024. < <https://www.tvplusafrrique.com/index.php?page=detail-article&article=6258&titre=LES+%C3%89PARGNANTS+DE+LA+POSTE+BANK+BIENT+%C3%94T+REMBOURS%C3%89S> >

The promise of reimbursement by savers at Poste Bank was well received. However, the implementation of this commitment is still eagerly awaited, the amount of reimbursement has been revised downwards, and the reimbursement is still pending.¹²⁴

Also, the lack of clear communication from the authorities regarding the fate of the 30,000 customers of the nebula BR SARL who were victims of financial fraud raises questions about the willingness and speed with which this case is being handled. For example, the extradition of Pastor MAPAKOU, founder of BR SARL, is still pending, although it is widely known that he is currently residing in Europe.¹²⁵

REVIEW OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN TRANSITION

Overall, there has been a fragile improvement in respect for human rights since the coup, with fewer cases of repression of civil and political liberties. However, vigilance is still necessary, as certain abuses, such as the shaving of the hair of people under arrest, the publication of humiliating videos of those arrested on social networks, and documented blunders, illustrate this fragility.

Moreover, it is regrettable that the Transition has not yet shed light on the numerous human rights violations and blood crimes committed during the 14 years of power of Ali Bongo Ondimba. By delaying the establishment of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission, the CTRI seems to be hesitant to open the burning issues of these years of repression, the involvement of which certain FDS could be highlighted.

124. “Reimbursement of Postebank savers: the State’s provision reduced to 3 billion CFA francs?”, Gabon Review. 17/02/2025. < <https://www.gabonreview.com/remboursement-des-epargnants-de-la-postebank-la-provision-de-letat-ramenee-a-3-milliards-de-fcfa/> >
125. “BR Sarl case: 75 billion, the colossal amount claimed by savers from the State”, aLibreville.com. 27/02/2020. < <http://news.alibreville.com/h/93407.html> >

CONCLUSION

The coup d'état of August 30, 2023 in Gabon marks a turning point in the country's political history. Described by some as a "palace revolution" because of its origin within the military elite and the absence of explicit popular demands, it is nevertheless part of a dynamic of rupture with the Bongo dynastic system. Led by Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, a former close associate of the regime, it was initially perceived as an internal reorganization of power. However, announcements of institutional and democratic reforms have fuelled hopes of deeper change.

The eighteen months of transition have made it possible to calm a tense socio-political climate and to initiate certain measures in the political and economic fields. Among them, the release of political prisoners and the promise of social reforms were hailed as progress. However, several challenges remain. The slowness in the processing of cases related to the crimes of the previous regime, the lack of transparency on certain corruption cases and the maintenance of figures of the former government in certain administrations and institutions, such as the former president of the Constitutional Court, raise questions about the real scope of the commitments made. In addition, the absence of a formal transitional justice mechanism, such as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which has been called for by part of the population, raises doubts about the authorities' willingness to definitively turn the page on the fallen system.

Some reforms, although presented as progress, remain incomplete or have a limited impact, only partially meeting popular expectations. Finally, the candidacy of the President of the Transition in the next election on April 12 somewhat blurs the visibility and trajectory of an early end to the transition, the results of which could well be overshadowed by the result of the election. The question is: after having carried out a bloodless coup d'état, what place will the army occupy in the country's political future and what democratic alternation could Gabon envisage in the aftermath of a presidential election in which actors of the fallen system and the transition predominate?

RECOMMENDATIONS

► TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE TRANSITION

- **Refrain from running in the next presidential election and guarantee that no military personnel involved in the transition will run in order to ensure a genuine democratic change;**
- **Transfer power to a democratically elected civilian government, in accordance with the commitments made following the coup;**
- **Organize a free, transparent and credible election, putting in place safeguards to prevent any fraud and definitively break with past practices;**
- **Preserve the security of citizens before, during and after the polls, by ensuring that electoral violence is prevented and that the cycles of tension observed in previous elections are broken;**
- **Facilitate the presence of national and international election observers to ensure independent monitoring of the electoral process;**
- **Put an end to violations of fundamental freedoms, in particular by guaranteeing freedom of association, opinion and assembly, in accordance with Gabon's international commitments.**

► TO THE GABONESE JUSTICE

- **Open independent and prompt investigations into the deaths of Glenn Patrick MOUNDENDE, Karl Stécy AKUE ANGOUE and Lionel ROKEWA, ensuring that those responsible are identified and prosecuted;**

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Investigate and prosecute allegations of torture and ill-treatment, including those of Hans OTOUNGA OBAME;
- Sanction companies involved in embezzlement revealed by the Task Force, by prosecuting those responsible for fraudulent practices;
- Launch legal proceedings against Ali Bongo and his relatives, examining their role in past electoral fraud and human rights violations under his tenure.

► TO THE NEXT GABONESE GOVERNMENT

- Establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in order to promote transitional justice and national reconciliation;
- Train the defence and security forces to respect fundamental freedoms, including freedom of association, expression and assembly, in accordance with the international conventions ratified by Gabon;
- Reform the method of appointment of judges of the Constitutional Court, involving several institutions in the process in order to guarantee its independence and prevent any political influence or nepotism;
- Request the extradition of Patrick MAPAKOU, so that he can answer before the Gabonese justice system to the charges of embezzlement in the BR Sarl case;
- Ensure the transparency of public finances by continuing to regularly publish the level of evolution of public debt on the government's official website, in collaboration with civil society.

ANNEXES

REPUBLIQUE GABONAISE

UNION – TRAVAIL – JUSTICE

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CHARTRE DE LA TRANSITION

*Ordonnance n°0003/PT/2023 du 2 septembre 2023
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-La loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023.

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D.P.O. | CHARTE DE LA TRANSITION EN REPUBLIQUE GABONAISE

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TABLE DES MATIERES :

PREAMBULE.....1

**TITRE I : DES VALEURS, PRINCIPES ET MISSIONS DE LA
TRANSITION.....4**

CHAPITRE PREMIER : DES VALEURS ET DES PRINCIPES.....4

CHAPITRE II : DES MISSIONS.....4

CHAPITRE III : DE L'ETAT ET DE LA SOUVERAINETE.....5

CHAPITRE IV : DES LIBERTES, DES DEVOIRS ET DES
DROITS FONDAMENTAUX.....6

TITRE II : DES ORGANES DE LA TRANSITION.....10

CHAPITRE PREMIER : DU PRESIDENT DE LA
TRANSITION.....11

CHAPITRE II : DU CONSEIL NATIONAL DE LA
TRANSITION.....14

CHAPITRE III : DU GOUVERNEMENT DE LA
TRANSITION.....14

CHAPITRE IV : DU PARLEMENT DE LA TRANSITION.....15

CHAPITRE V : DE LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE
LATRANSITION.....19

CHAPITRE V BIS : DU CONSEIL ECONOMIQUE, SOCIAL ET
ENVIRONNEMENTAL DE LA TRANSITION.....20

CHAPITRES VI : DES AUTRES DISPOSITIONS.....21

**TITRE III : DE LA REVISION DE LA CHARTE DE LA
TRANSITION.....21**

**TITRE IV : DES DISPOSITIONS TRANSITOIRES ET
FINALES.....22**

***Ordonnance n°0003/PT/2023 du 2 septembre 2023
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-La loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023

Le Président de la Transition,
Chef de l'État ;

Vu la loi n°3/91 du 26 mars 1991 portant Constitution
de la République Gabonaise ;

O R D O N N E :

PREAMBULE

Nous, membres des forces de défense et de sécurité de la
République Gabonaise, regroupés au sein du Comité pour la
Transition et la Restauration des Institutions, en abrégé CTRI,
avec les forces vives de la Nation Gabonaise :

-mus par un élan de sursaut national pour la refondation de
l'État, la préservation des principes républicains et le
renouveau de la démocratie et de la citoyenneté ;

-inspirés par la volonté et l'engagement partagé de
changement pour le bien-être et le vivre ensemble du peuple
souverain du Gabon, ayant conduit à la prise effective du
pouvoir par l'armée gabonaise, sous la direction du Comité
pour la Transition et la Restauration des Institutions, le 30
août 2023 ;

-considérant l'adhésion populaire qui en est résulté ;

-considérant les conclusions des concertations nationales
inclusives, tenues à Libreville au Palais Rénovation, avec les
représentants des partis politiques, des organisations de la
société civile, des confessions religieuses, des coordinations
régionales, des organisations de femmes et de jeunes, des
gabonais de l'étranger, des centrales et fédérations syndicales,

du secteur informel, des organisations patronales, des organisations et ordres socioprofessionnels, des chambres consulaires, des organismes de presse et de toutes les autres forces vives de la Nation ;

-prenant acte des propositions et recommandations des différentes composantes des forces vives de la Nation ;

-soucieux de maintenir la cohésion nationale, de consolider les bases de notre démocratie et de promouvoir le développement et la prospérité des gabonais et gabonaises ;

-reconnaissant que les crises politiques et sociales cycliques, les détournements de fonds publics qui ont affligé la République Gabonaise avant et après le changement de la Constitution, de la loi électorale et des résultats tronqués de l'élection présidentielle de 2023 pour favoriser un troisième mandat du Président Ali BONGO ONDIMBA, ont fissuré l'unité nationale, décrédibilisé les institutions et ralenti le développement du pays ;

-conscients de la nécessité de bâtir ensemble d'une manière durable les fondamentaux d'une République démocratique stable, unie dans sa diversité et respectueuse des Droits de l'Homme et des libertés publiques ;

-engagés à construire un véritable État de droit conforme aux profondes aspirations du peuple gabonais et tirant les leçons de notre expérience politique, notamment des crises récurrentes et souvent violentes qu'a connues notre pays suite aux différents scrutins ces dernières années ;

-considérant les cas de violations répétées des Droits de l'Homme et des libertés individuelles et collectives, qui ont endeuillé des familles et causé des handicaps à des milliers de femmes et de jeunes gabonais en particulier ;

-réaffirmant notre attachement aux valeurs et principes démocratiques tels qu'inscrits dans la Charte des Nations-Unies, la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme du

10 décembre 1948, la Charte Africaine de la démocratie, des élections et de la gouvernance du 30 janvier 2007 de l'Union Africaine ;

-considérant la volonté résolue du Comité pour la Transition et la Restauration des Institutions de refonder l'État, pour plus de sécurité juridique fondée sur l'équité et la justice, dans un esprit inclusif ;

-considérant la détermination du Comité pour la Transition et la Restauration des Institutions de combattre toute forme de marginalisation et de repli identitaire, de prévenir et réprimer la corruption, les crimes économiques et financiers, l'impunité, la politisation de l'Administration publique et l'instrumentalisation de la Justice ;

-considérant le comportement patriotique des forces de défense et de sécurité assurant la quiétude sociale et la continuité de l'État ;

-considérant que l'intérêt supérieur de la nation réside dans le maintien de la paix, la sécurité collective, le bon voisinage dans la sous-région, qui sont des préalables à l'émergence, à la stabilité, à l'intégration et à la coopération comme moyens de rassemblement et de consolidation de la démocratie ;

-considérant la nécessité d'une Transition démocratique inclusive et impartiale ;

Approuvons et adoptons la présente Charte de la Transition dont le préambule est partie intégrante.

TITRE I : DES VALEURS, PRINCIPES ET MISSIONS DE LA TRANSITION

CHAPITRE PREMIER : DES VALEURS ET DES PRINCIPES

Article 1^{er}

Outre les valeurs affirmées par la Constitution du 26 mars 1991 en son préambule, la présente Charte consacre les valeurs et principes suivants pour conduire la Transition :

- le patriotisme, la loyauté et la probité ;
- la Justice, l'impartialité et la dignité ;
- le mérite, le sens de la responsabilité et de la redevabilité ;
- la discipline, le civisme et la citoyenneté ;
- la fraternité, la tolérance et l'inclusion ;
- la neutralité, la transparence et l'intégrité ;
- le dialogue et l'esprit de consensus ;
- l'esprit de solidarité, de pardon et de réconciliation.

CHAPITRE II : DES MISSIONS

Article 2

Les missions de la Transition consacrées par la présente Charte sont notamment :

- la refondation de l'État afin de bâtir des Institutions fortes, crédibles et légitimes garantissant un État de droit, un processus démocratique transparent et inclusif, apaisé et durable, seules garanties pour un développement véritable du Gabon ;
- la préservation de l'intégrité du territoire national et de la sécurité des personnes et de leurs biens ;
- l'engagement de réformes majeures sur les plans politique, économique, culturel, administratif et électoral ;

-le renforcement de l'indépendance de la Justice et la lutte contre l'impunité ;

-la promotion et la protection des Droits de l'Homme et des libertés publiques ;

-l'instauration d'une culture de bonne gouvernance et de citoyenneté responsable ;

-l'élaboration d'une nouvelle Constitution et son adoption par référendum ;

-l'organisation des élections locales et nationales libres, démocratiques et transparentes.

CHAPITRE III : DE L'ETAT ET DE LA SOVERAINETE

Article 3

Le Gabon est une République unie et indivisible, souveraine, laïque, sociale et démocratique.

Article 4

L'emblème national est le drapeau tricolore, vert, jaune et bleu de bandes horizontales et de dimensions égales.

L'hymne national est « La Concorde ».

La devise de la République est « Union-Travail-Justice ».

Le sceau et les armoiries de la République sont ceux déterminés par la loi.

Article 5

Les langues officielles sont le français et l'anglais.

Article 6

Les partis politiques concourent à l'expression du suffrage.

Ils se constituent librement et exercent leurs activités dans le respect des lois de la République.

Ils doivent incarner la diversité nationale.

Ils ont le devoir d'éduquer leurs militants et de promouvoir l'unité nationale et la paix sociale.

Article 7

Tout acte portant atteinte à la forme républicaine de l'État, à la laïcité de l'État, à la souveraineté, à l'indépendance et à l'unité nationale est un crime de haute trahison et puni comme tel par la loi.

CHAPITRE IV : DES LIBERTES, DES DEVOIRS ET DES DROITS FONDAMENTAUX

Article 8

Les libertés et droits fondamentaux sont reconnus et leur exercice est garanti aux citoyens dans les conditions et les formes prévues par la loi. Aucune situation d'exception ou d'urgence ne doit justifier les violations des droits humains.

Article 9

Tous les citoyens gabonais sont égaux en droits et en devoirs. Ils sont égaux devant la loi sans aucune distinction. Ils sont électeurs et éligibles dans les conditions déterminées par la loi.

Article 10

La personne humaine est sacrée. Toute personne a droit au respect de son intégrité physique et morale, de son identité et

à la protection de son intimité et de sa vie privée. Tout citoyen a droit au libre développement de sa personne, dans le respect du droit d'autrui, des bonnes mœurs et de l'ordre public.

Article 11

Nul ne peut faire l'objet de tortures, de peines ou de traitements cruels, dégradants ou inhumains.

Article 12

Nul ne peut être arrêté, inculqué, ni détenu que dans les cas prévus par la loi promulguée antérieurement à la commission de l'infraction qu'elle réprime. Les arrestations et détentions arbitraires sont interdites par la loi. Le droit à l'assistance d'un avocat est reconnu dès l'instant de l'interpellation ou de la détention.

Article 13

Tout prévenu est présumé innocent jusqu'à l'établissement de sa culpabilité à la suite d'un procès régulier offrant des garanties à sa défense.

Article 14

La peine est personnelle. Aucun individu ne peut être rendu responsable et poursuivi de quelque façon ou pour quelque motif que ce soit pour un fait non commis par lui-même.

Article 15

La loi punit quiconque par un acte de discrimination raciale, ethnique, religieuse, par un acte de propagande régionaliste ou communautariste, ou par tout autre acte qui porte atteinte à l'unité nationale, à la sécurité de l'État, à l'intégrité du territoire de la République, ou au bon fonctionnement démocratique des Institutions.

Article 16

Tout citoyen a le droit de fixer librement son domicile ou sa résidence en un lieu quelconque du territoire national et d'y exercer toute activité conformément aux dispositions de la loi.

Article 17

Le domicile est inviolable et le secret de la correspondance est garanti à tous les citoyens.

Il ne peut être porté atteinte à ces droits que dans les cas prévus par la loi.

Article 18

Tout citoyen a le droit de circuler librement à l'intérieur du territoire national, d'en sortir, d'y revenir et de s'y établir temporairement ou durablement. Il ne peut être porté atteinte à ces droits que dans les conditions définies par la loi.

Article 19

Tout individu a le droit de s'informer librement et d'être informé.

Article 20

Tout individu a droit à la création, à la protection et à la jouissance de ses œuvres intellectuelles et artistiques.

Article 21

Tout citoyen a droit au travail et à une juste rémunération. Nul ne peut être lésé dans son emploi en raison de son origine, de sa religion, de son sexe ou de ses opinions.

Article 22

Tout citoyen a droit d'accès aux emplois publics dans les conditions fixées par la loi.

Article 23

Les libertés d'opinion, d'expression, de conscience et de culte sont garanties. Les conditions de leur exercice sont définies par la loi.

Article 24

La liberté d'entreprise est garantie.

Article 25

Le mariage, l'union entre deux personnes de sexes différents, et la famille constituent le fondement naturel de la vie en société. Ils sont protégés et promus par l'État.

Article 26

Le citoyen gabonais séjournant ou résidant à l'étranger bénéficie de la protection de l'État dans les limites fixées par les lois du pays d'accueil ainsi que des accords internationaux dont le Gabon est partie.

Article 27

La République Gabonaise accorde le droit d'asile, sur son territoire, aux ressortissants étrangers dans les conditions déterminées par la loi.

Article 28

Le droit de propriété est garanti. Nul ne peut être exproprié que pour cause d'utilité publique déclarée, dans les conditions et formes prescrites par la loi, suivant une compensation préalable et juste.

La vente des terres aux non nationaux est interdite en République Gabonaise.

Article 29

La défense de la patrie est un devoir sacré pour tout citoyen Gabonais.

Article 30

La participation aux charges publiques en fonction de la fortune et des revenus est un devoir pour chaque citoyen.

Article 31

Le respect et la défense du patrimoine national et des biens publics sont un devoir pour tout citoyen.

Article 32

Le respect des lois et règlements est un devoir impératif pour chaque citoyen.

Article 33

Toutes les activités politiques, y compris celles qui concernent l'expression du suffrage, s'exercent dans les conditions fixées par la loi.

TITRE II : DES ORGANES DE LA TRANSITION

Article 34 (*Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023*)

Les organes de la Transition sont :

- le Président de la Transition ;
- le Conseil National de la Transition ;
- le Gouvernement de la Transition ;
- le Parlement de la Transition ;
- la Cour Constitutionnelle de la Transition ;

-le Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental de la Transition.

CHAPITRE PREMIER : DU PRESIDENT DE LA TRANSITION

Article 35 (*Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023*)

Le Président de la Transition remplit les fonctions de Président de la République, Chef de l'État. Il est le Ministre de la Défense Nationale et de la Sécurité. Il veille au respect de la Charte de la Transition et de la Constitution du 26 mars 1991.

Il est choisi par un collège de désignation mis en place par le Comité pour la Transition et la Restauration des Institutions.

Article 36 (*Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023*)

Les pouvoirs et prérogatives du Président de la Transition sont définis dans la présente Charte et la Constitution du 26 mars 1991.

Article 37 (*Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023*)

Le mandat du Président de la Transition prend fin après l'investiture du Président issu de l'élection présidentielle.

Article 38

Tout candidat aux fonctions de Président de la Transition doit remplir les conditions suivantes :

- être une personnalité civile ou militaire ;
- être de nationalité gabonaise d'origine au sens du Titre I du Code de nationalité ;
- être âgé de 35 ans au moins et de 70 ans au plus ;
- être intègre, de bonne moralité et impartial ;
- être une personnalité de notoriété publique ;
- jouir de ses capacités physique et mentale ;

-n’avoir jamais fait l’objet d’une condamnation pénale pour crime ;
-être reconnu pour son engagement dans la défense des intérêts nationaux.

Article 39 (Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023)

Le Président de la Transition, Président de la République, Chef de l’Etat, entre en fonction sept (07) jours au plus après sa désignation.

Avant d’entrer en fonction, il prête devant la Cour Constitutionnelle le serment suivant : « ***Je jure devant Dieu et le peuple gabonais, de préserver en toute fidélité le régime républicain, de respecter et de faire respecter la Charte de la Transition et la Loi, de remplir mes fonctions dans l’intérêt supérieur du peuple, de préserver les acquis démocratiques, l’indépendance de la patrie et l’intégrité du territoire national. Je m’engage solennellement et sur l’honneur à mettre tout en œuvre pour la réalisation de l’unité nationale*** ».

Après l’investiture, le Président de la Commission Nationale de Lutte contre l’Enrichissement Illicite reçoit publiquement la déclaration écrite des biens du Président et du Vice-président de la Transition. Cette déclaration fait l’objet d’une mise à jour annuelle.

Dans un délai maximum d’un (1) mois avant la fin de la transition, le Président de la Commission de la Lutte contre l’Enrichissement Illicite reçoit une seconde déclaration écrite des biens du Président et du Vice-président de la Transition.

Celle-ci est publiée au Journal Officiel accompagnée des justificatifs éventuels en cas d’augmentation du patrimoine.

Cette obligation de déclaration des biens s’applique également à tous les membres des organes de la Transition

institués par la présente Charte, à l’entrée et à la fin de leurs fonctions.

Article 40

Le Président de la Transition peut être assisté d’un Vice-Président de la Transition remplissant les fonctions de Vice-Président de la République.

Le Vice-Président de la Transition est nommé par le Président de la Transition qui met fin à ses fonctions.

Le Vice-Président de la Transition n’est pas éligible à l’élection présidentielle qui sera organisée pour marquer la fin de la Transition.

La présente disposition n’est pas susceptible de révision.

Article 41 (Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023)

Il est créé un Secrétariat Général de la Présidence de la République dirigé par un Secrétaire Général nommé par le Président de la Transition.

Le Secrétaire Général de la Présidence de la République est chargé de la coordination de l’action présidentielle.

Le Secrétaire Général de la Présidence de la République en exercice pendant la Transition ne peut se porter candidat à l’élection présidentielle qui sera organisée pour marquer la fin de la Transition.

CHAPITRE II : DU CONSEIL NATIONAL DE LA TRANSITION

Article 42 (Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023)

Le Conseil National de la Transition, en abrégé CNT, assiste le Président de la Transition dans la détermination de la politique de la Nation.

Il est composé des membres du Comité pour la Transition et la Restauration des Institutions, en abrégé CTRI.

Le Conseil National de la Transition exerce les prérogatives définies par la présente Charte et se réfère aux dispositions de la Constitution du 26 mars 1991.

CHAPITRE III : DU GOUVERNEMENT DE LA TRANSITION

Article 43 (Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023)

Le Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement et les autres Membres du Gouvernement de la Transition sont nommés par le Président de la Transition.

Ils sont placés sous l'autorité du Président de la Transition à qui ils rendent directement compte.

Les Membres du Gouvernement sont nommés sur proposition du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement.

Article 44

Les membres du Gouvernement de la Transition doivent remplir les conditions suivantes :

- être de nationalité gabonaise d'origine ;
- jouir de ses capacités physique et mentale ;
- n'avoir jamais fait l'objet d'une condamnation pénale pour crime ;

- avoir les compétences requises ;
- être reconnu pour son engagement patriotique ;
- être de bonne moralité.

Avant leur entrée en fonction, les membres du gouvernement de la Transition prêtent serment au cours d'une audience solennelle présidée par le Président de la Transition en présence des membres de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la Transition, des Présidents et Vice-présidents des deux Chambres du Parlement de la Transition et les Présidents de la Cour de Cassation, du Conseil d'État et de la Cour des Comptes, selon les termes ci-après :

« Je jure de respecter la Constitution et l'État de droit, de remplir consciencieusement les devoirs de ma charge dans le strict respect de ses obligations de loyauté à l'égard du Président de la Transition, Chef de l'État, de garder religieusement, même après la cessation de mes fonctions, la confidentialité des dossiers et des informations classés Secret d'État et dont j'aurais eu connaissance dans l'exercice de celle-ci ».

Les membres du Gouvernement de la Transition ne sont pas éligibles à l'élection présidentielle qui sera organisée pour marquer la fin de la Transition.

Les officiers supérieurs des Forces de Défense et de Sécurité, nommés membres du Gouvernement, réintègrent leurs corps d'origine à la cessation de leurs fonctions ministérielles.

CHAPITRE IV : DU PARLEMENT DE LA TRANSITION

Article 45

Le Parlement de la Transition est l'organe législatif de la Transition. Il comprend deux Chambres : l'Assemblée Nationale de la Transition et le Sénat de la Transition.

Article 46 (Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023)

L'Assemblée Nationale de la Transition est composée de quatre-vingt-dix-huit (98) membres parmi lesquels :

- soixante-sept (67) issus des partis politiques légalement reconnus ou choisis parmi les personnalités politiques ;
- vingt-cinq (25) de la société civile ;
- six (06) membres issus des Forces de Défense et de Sécurité.

Les membres issus des partis politiques sont choisis par le Président de la Transition sur les listes présentées par les partis politiques légalement reconnus.

Un décret du Président de la Transition porte nomination des membres de l'Assemblée Nationale de la Transition.

Le Bureau de l'Assemblée Nationale de la Transition comprend un (01) Président, cinq (05) Vice-Présidents, deux (02) Questeurs et cinq (5) Secrétaires de Bureau.

Article 47 (Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023)

Le Sénat de la Transition comprend soixante-dix (70) membres parmi lesquels :

- trente-sept (37) membres issus des partis politiques ;
- vingt-sept (27) membres représentant la société civile ;
- six (06) membres issus des Forces de Défense et de Sécurité.

Les membres du Sénat de la Transition doivent être âgés de cinquante (50) ans au moins.

Un décret du Président de la Transition porte nomination des membres du Sénat de la Transition.

Le Bureau du Sénat de la Transition comprend un (01) Président, (05) Vice-Présidents, deux (02) Questeurs et cinq (05) Secrétaires de Bureau.

Article 48 (Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023)

Chaque Chambre du Parlement de la Transition est présidée par une personnalité nommée par le Président de la Transition.

Les incompatibilités aux fonctions de parlementaire de la Transition sont prévues dans les textes organiques de chaque Chambre du Parlement.

Article 49 (Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023)

Le Parlement de la Transition se réunit de plein droit au cours de deux sessions ordinaires par an.

La première session ordinaire de la Transition s'ouvre le 1^{er} jour ouvré du mois de mars et prend fin le dernier jour ouvré du mois de juin.

La seconde session ordinaire de la Transition s'ouvre le 1^{er} jour ouvré du mois de septembre et prend fin le dernier jour ouvré du mois de décembre.

A titre exceptionnel, la seconde session ordinaire de l'année 2023 s'ouvre dix (10) jours après la nomination de l'ensemble des membres du Parlement de la Transition.

Au cours de la séance inaugurale, chaque Chambre du Parlement de la Transition adopte son Règlement Intérieur.

Les Chambres du Parlement de la Transition peuvent se réunir en sessions extraordinaires sur convocation de leurs Présidents pour un ordre du jour déterminé à la demande soit du Président de la Transition sur proposition du Premier Ministre de la Transition, soit de la majorité absolue de leurs membres.

Les sessions extraordinaires sont ouvertes et closes par décret du Président de la Transition, Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat.

Elles ne peuvent excéder une durée de quinze (15) jours.

Article 50

Le Parlement de la Transition adopte le plan d'actions et la feuille de route de la Transition présentés par le Premier Ministre.

Il veille à l'exécution, au contrôle et au suivi-évaluation du plan d'actions et de la feuille de route de la Transition.

Article 51

Le Parlement de la Transition exerce les prérogatives définies par la présente Charte et la Constitution du 26 mars 1991.

Article 52 (*Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023*)

Les Présidents et les Vice-Présidents des deux Chambres du Parlement de la Transition ne sont pas éligibles à l'élection présidentielle qui sera organisée pour marquer la fin de la Transition.

La présente disposition n'est susceptible d'aucune révision.

Article 52 Bis (*Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023*)

Les membres du Parlement de la Transition portent le titre de « Député » ou de « Sénateur » de la Transition. Leur mandat court à compter de la date de leur nomination et se termine à la fin de la Transition.

En cas de manquement avéré aux valeurs prônées par la présente Charte, le Président de la Transition peut décider, après avis du Bureau de la Chambre concernée, de mettre un terme au mandat d'un Député ou d'un Sénateur de la Transition.

Dans ce cas, il est procédé à son remplacement dans les mêmes formes et conditions que celles qui ont prévalu lors de sa nomination.

CHAPITRE V : DE LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE LA TRANSITION

Article 53

Avant leur entrée en fonction, les membres de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la Transition prêtent serment au cours d'une audience solennelle présidée par le Président de la Transition en présence des Présidents et Vice-présidents des deux Chambres du Parlement de la Transition et les Présidents de la Cour de Cassation, du Conseil d'État et de la Cour des Comptes.

La Cour Constitutionnelle de la Transition contrôle la conformité à la Charte de la transition et à la Constitution du 26 mars 1991 des actes législatifs et réglementaires pris par les organes de la Transition.

La Cour Constitutionnelle de la Transition statue sur la régularité des opérations de référendum dont elle proclame les résultats à l'issue du contentieux dont elle serait saisie.

Article 54

La Cour Constitutionnelle de la Transition est composée de neuf (09) membres nommés par le Président de la Transition parmi les hauts cadres de la Nation dont le Président.

Le Président de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la Transition n'est pas éligible à l'élection présidentielle qui sera organisée pour marquer la fin de la Transition.

CHAPITRE V BIS : DU CONSEIL ECONOMIQUE, SOCIAL ET ENVIRONNEMENTAL DE LA TRANSITION *(Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023)*

Article 54 Bis *(Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023)*

Le Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental de la Transition est une assemblée consultative.

Article 54 Ter *(Loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023)*

Le Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental de la Transition comprend soixante (60) membres parmi lesquels :

- vingt (20) membres choisis parmi les personnalités qualifiées qui ont honoré les services de l'Etat ;
- onze (11) membres représentant les associations légalement constituées ;
- six (6) membres représentant les organisations patronales ;
- six (6) membres représentant les organisations syndicales ;
- six (6) membres désignés par les confessions religieuses ;
- onze (11) membres désignés par les organisations traditionnelles.

Un décret du Président de la Transition porte nomination des membres du Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental de la Transition.

Le Bureau du Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental de la Transition comprend un (01) Président, deux (02) Vice-Présidents, deux (02) Questeurs et (02) Secrétaires de Bureau.

Le Président du Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental de la Transition n'est pas éligible à l'élection présidentielle qui sera organisée pour marquer la fin de la Transition.

CHAPITRE VI : DES AUTRES DISPOSITIONS

Article 55

L'accès des femmes aux fonctions électives et nominatives peut être favorisé par des mesures particulières prévues par la loi.

La composition des différents organes de la Transition prend en compte le genre.

Article 56

Dans les cas de présomption de terrorisme et d'atteinte à la sûreté nationale, la garde à vue peut atteindre cent soixante-huit heures, délai au-delà duquel une décision d'un magistrat de l'ordre judiciaire est requise.

Article 57

Les responsables administratifs et financiers ou questeurs des Institutions de la République sont nommés par décret pris en Conseil des Ministres.

TITRE III : DE LA REVISION DE LA CHARTE DE LA TRANSITION

Article 58

L'initiative de la révision de la présente Charte appartient concurremment au Président de la Transition et aux membres des Bureaux des Chambres du Parlement de la Transition.

Le projet ou la proposition de révision est adopté à la majorité des 4/5^{ème} des membres des Bureaux des Chambres du Parlement de la Transition.

Le Président de la Transition procède à la promulgation de l'acte de révision.

TITRE IV : DES DISPOSITIONS TRANSITOIRES ET FINALES

Article 59

Les membres du Comité pour la Transition et la Restauration des Institutions, en abrégé CTRI, et tous les acteurs ayant participé aux événements allant du 29 août 2023 à l'investiture du Président de la Transition, bénéficient de l'immunité. À ce titre, ils ne peuvent être poursuivis ou arrêtés pour des actes posés lors desdits événements. Une loi d'amnistie sera adoptée à cet effet.

Article 60

La présente Charte entre en vigueur dès sa signature.

Article 61

En cas de contrariété entre la Charte de la Transition et la Constitution du 26 mars 1991, les dispositions de la présente Charte s'appliquent. La Cour Constitutionnelle de la Transition statue en cas de litige.

Article 62

Jusqu'à la mise en place des organes de la Transition, le Comité pour la Transition et la Restauration des Institutions, en abrégé CTRI, prend les mesures nécessaires au fonctionnement des pouvoirs publics, à la vie de la Nation, à la protection des citoyens et à la sauvegarde des libertés.

Article 63

La présente ordonnance, qui abroge toutes dispositions antérieures contraires, sera enregistrée, publiée au Journal Officiel et communiquée partout où besoin sera.

Fait à Libreville, le 02 septembre 2023

Par le Président de la Transition,
Chef de l'État

Le Commandant en Chef de la Garde Républicaine,
Général de Brigade Brice Clotaire OLIGUI NGUEMA

Le Commandant en Chef des Forces de Police Nationale
Général de Division Serge Hervé NGOMA

Le Chef d'Etat-major Général des Forces Armées Gabonaise
Général de Division Jean Martin OSSIMA NDONG

Le Commandant en Chef de la Gendarmerie Nationale
Général de Division Yves BARRASSOUAGA

Le Commandant en Chef de la Sécurité Pénitentiaire
Général de Division Germain EFFAYONG

Le Directeur Général du Service de Santé Militaire
Général d'Armée Raymond NZENZE

Le Directeur Général du Génie Militaire
Général de Brigade Gabin OYUGOU

Révisée par la loi n°001/2023 du 6 octobre 2023

Le Président de la Transition,
Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat

Général de Brigade Brice Clotaire OLIGUI NGUEMA

Le Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement
Raymond NDONG SIMA

Le Ministre de la Réformes des Institutions
Murielle MINKOUE épouse MINTSA

Le Ministre des Comptes Publics
Charles MBA

*Le Ministre Délégué à la Présidence, chargé de l'Intérieur et
de la Sécurité*
Hermann IMMONGAULT

Discours intégral d’investiture du Général de brigade Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, président de la Transition | Présidence de la république Gabonaise

Mesdames et Messieurs de la presse ;
Chers ainés, Chers amis ;
Messieurs les officiers généraux ;
Officiers ;
Sous-officiers et militaires du rang
Mesdames et Messieurs, vos grades, rangs et qualités respectés.
Gabonaises, Gabonais,

Mes chers compatriotes

Je voudrais commencer cette allocution en adressant d’un cœur reconnaissant, une action de grâce au Dieu tout Puissant.

C’est grâce à ses bontés sans cesse renouvelées pour notre pays le Gabon que nous pouvons fièrement nous tenir ici ce matin dans cette Hémicycle du palais de la rénovation. Ce même Dieu, qui nous a parlé le matin du 30 août 2023, et qui continue de nous parler, est celui qui a conduit nos pas jusqu’ici.

Permettez-moi de rappeler à votre souvenir, les paroles prononcées par Feu le président Omar BONGO dans cette salle, au terme de 42 ans de règne après Feu le Président Léon MBA, premier Président du Gabon : “Dieu ne nous a pas donné le droit de faire du Gabon ce que nous sommes en train de faire, il nous observe. Le dit : amusez-vous. Le jour où il voudra aussi nous sanctionner, il le fera”

Cette phrase remplie de sagesse, était en réalité la voix de Dieu qui a fini par accomplir sa volonté pour le peuple Gabonais aujourd’hui.

Gabonaises, Gabonais, mes chers compatriotes

Permettez-moi d’exprimer mes sincères remerciements à tous ceux qui, nombreux, très nombreux, ont effectué le déplacement pour prendre part à cette cérémonie d’investiture.

J’ai une pensée particulière pour tous les gabonais de la Diaspora qui suivent cette cérémonie de là où ils sont.

Mais j’ai surtout une pensée spéciale pour tous nos compatriotes qui auraient rêvé vivre ce jour mais nous ont précédé dans l’au-delà. Je pense à tous les partisans du changement et de l’alternance : Simon Oyono Aba’a, Martine Oulabou, Pierre Louis Agondjo Okawè, Pierre Mamboundou Mamboundou, André Mba Obame pour ne citer que ceux-là.

Comme disait l’ancien Président Ghanéen, Jerry John Rawlings “Quand le peuple est écrasé par ses dirigeants, avec la complicité des juges, c’est à l’armée de lui rendre sa liberté”.

C’est fort de cet esprit que le 30 août 2023, telle une météorite dans la nuit noire, les Forces de Défense et de Sécurité de notre pays ont pris leurs responsabilités en refusant le coup d’état électoral qui venait d’être annoncé par le Centre Gabonais des Élections à la suite d’un processus électoral outrageusement biaisé.

C’est sans aucune violence, sans heurts et sans effusion de sang que le Comité pour la Transition et la Restauration des institutions (CTRI) a changé le régime en place, qui confisquait le pouvoir des institutions de la République depuis quelques années, au mépris flagrant des règles démocratiques.

Cette action patriotique inédite, restera sans aucun doute, un “cas école” dans les annales de l’histoire.

L’armée républicaine s’est inscrite dans le refus de cautionner une forfaiture qui aurait, une fois de trop, coûté la vie à de nombreux citoyens. Le peuple demande tout simplement que ses droits soient, garantis à travers des institutions fonctionnelles.

Les forces de défense et de sécurité avaient un double choix : soit tuer des gabonais, qui auraient légitimement manifesté, soit mettre fin à un processus électoral pipé, dont les conditions du déroulement ne permettaient d’ailleurs pas l’expression démocratique.

C’est en toute responsabilité que nous avons dit : « NON. Plus jamais ça dans notre beau pays le Gabon ! ». C’est l’occasion pour nous de remercier le soutien du peuple qui, de manière spontanée a adhéré à cet acte patriotique.

Notre étonnement est grand lorsqu’on entend certaines institutions internationales condamnent l’acte posé par des soldats qui n’ont fait que respecter leur serment sous le drapeau : sauver la Patrie au prix de leur vie.

Desmond Tutu disait, je le cite « si vous êtes neutres, devant une situation d’injustice, c’est que vous avez choisi d’être du côté de l’opresseur ». Nous, Forces de Défense et de sécurité, nous avons choisi d’être du côté du peuple et de la liberté. Comme le Général De Gaulle jadis.

Mes Chers Compatriotes,

La constitution est le texte fondateur d’un Etat. Elle consacre ses institutions, ses procédures particulières et les mécanismes de représentation n’arrivaient plus à mettre notre société, en situation de suivre. Il est donc important que les Gabonais de toutes les couches s’accordent pour adopter, par référendum une nouvelle constitution ainsi qu’un code électoral et un code pénal fiable, qui garantit à tous les mêmes chances.

Notre pays mérite des institutions fortes, crédibles, une gouvernance assainie, plus en phase avec les normes internationales en matière de respect des droits humains des libertés fondamentales, de la démocratie, de l’Etat de droit.

Je souligne par ailleurs que le Gabon est un pays indivisible, dans la diversité de ses cultures, sa complexité ethnique et sa géographie. L’unité de notre peuple doit toujours être la condition essentielle pour l’exercice de nos libertés fondamentales. J’y veillerai personnellement durant toute la période de transition.

De même que je m’engage à ce que les relations séculaires entre les Gabonais et nos frères étrangers soient toujours des relations de grande amitié, de tolérance et de concorde.

La politique et l’administration dans un pays, sont des domaines de souveraineté nationale, le dire n’est nullement de la xénophobie.

APPENDIX 2

Mes Chers Compatriotes

Depuis quelques jours, le Comité pour la transition et la restauration des institutions a entrepris des consultations avec toutes les forces vives de la Nation.

Les préoccupations soulevées sont légitimes et limpides. Aussi, avec le gouvernement qui va être mis en place dans quelques jours, composé de gens expérimentés et de personnes à la compétence avérée, nous allons nous atteler à donner à tous, des raisons d’espérer à une vie meilleure.

Ici et maintenant, je m’engage solennellement à ne ménager aucun effort pour qu’a l’issue de cette transition notre pays soit doté d’institutions fortes, démocratiques et crédibles.

Chers compatriotes,

En droit international on dit que les relations entre les états sont au-dessus des personnes. Autrement dit, les hommes passent et l’Etat demeure. Le Gabon a été un des membres fondateurs de nombreuses organisations régionales et sous régionales, il entend à ce titre, jouer pleinement son rôle dans le concert des nations.

Peuple gabonais,

Aujourd’hui, les temps heureux rêvés par nos ancêtres arrivent enfin chez nous. Il faut donc des changements profonds, issus de notre réflexion commune. C’est pourquoi j’instruis déjà le futur gouvernement à réfléchir sans délais sur les mécanismes à mettre en place afin de :

Faciliter le retour au pays de tous les exilés politiques ;
Rétablir la bourse pour les élèves du secondaire ;
Amnistier les prisonniers d’opinions ;
Financer l’économie nationale avec les partenaires locaux et les institutions financières locales ;
Créer une synergie, avec l’accompagnement des banques locales, pour le paiement des pensions des retraités ;
Réviser les conditions d’attribution de la Nationalité Gabonaise ;
Réviser les lois du foncier en république Gabonaise.
À l’issue de cette transition, avec l’apport de tous les gabonais partenaires au développement, nous entendons remettre le pouvoir aux civils en organisant de nouvelles élections libres, transparentes et crédibles dans la paix.

Hommage aux pères fondateurs de notre belle Nation.

Peuple Gabonais, c’est enfin notre essor vers la félicité.

Honneur et fidélité à la patrie.

Je vous remercie.

Comité pour la Transition et la Restauration des Institutions du Gabon

- 1- La restauration de la stabilité et de la confiance ;
- 2- La réforme institutionnelle et législative ;
- 3- La lutte contre la corruption ;
- 4- Le développement durable et économique ;
- 5- L'éducation et la sensibilisation ;
- 6- Le dialogue national et la consultation publique.

Pour atteindre ces objectifs plusieurs préalables doivent être pris en compte :

- 1. Faire à nouveau parler les Gabonais qui en avaient perdu l'habitude.
- 2. Remettre en état une économie ruinée par 14 ans de gabegie et de pillage.
- 3. Réduire une dette colossale qui n'a pas servi au développement du pays.
- 4. Répondre aux principales demandes populaires pour garantir la paix sociale que n'offrirait aucune élection.
- 5. Laisser le Peuple gabonais décider démocratiquement par le biais de ses représentant au Parlement et, surtout, au Dialogue National Inclusif.

Période 1 [Septembre 2023](#)

Rencontre avec les Forces Vives de la Nation.

Période 2 [Septembre à Octobre 2023](#)

Mise en place des Institutions de la Transition (Cour Constitutionnelle, Gouvernement, Sénat, Assemblée Nationale, Conseil Economique Social et Environnemental).

Période 3 [Du 9 octobre au 30 novembre 2023](#)

Appel à contribution sur le diagnostic de la situation et les moyens de corriger les différents dysfonctionnements et collecte de ces contributions par un Secrétariat créé auprès du Ministère de la Réforme des institutions.

Période 4 [Décembre 2023](#)

Inventaire des problèmes identifiés et synthèse des propositions.

Période 5 [Janvier 2024](#)

Restitution de la synthèse et enrichissement du rapport.

Période 6 [Fin février 2024](#)

Adoption de la synthèse après la prise en compte des dernières observations.

Période 7 [Du 1er au 30 avril 2024](#)

Dialogue National Inclusif devant dessiner les nouveaux contours politiques et institutionnels de la République sous la présidence de l'Archevêque de Libreville.

Période 9 [Fin août 2024](#)

Disponibilité de la première mouture de la future Constitution.

Période 10 [Fin du mois d'octobre 2024](#)

Adoption par la Constituante, après intégration des observations, du projet final de Constitution.

Période 12 [Janvier 2025](#)

Début des travaux du nouveau Code électoral.

Période 15 [Fin février 2025](#)

Prise en compte des remarques et observations et disponibilité du texte final.

Période 16 [Mi-mars 2025](#)

Adoption du texte par le Parlement et promulgation par le Chef de l'Etat.

Période 17 [Avril 2025](#)

Début de la révision de la liste électorale.

Période 18 [Juillet 2025](#)

Distribution des cartes d'électeurs et mise en place du matériel électoral.

Période 19 [Août 2025](#)

Elections et fin de la transition



Calendrier opérationnel du DNI

N°	ETAPES	PERIODE CIBLE	ENTITES DU DNI
1	OUVERTURE DU DNI REUNION DU BUREAU DU DNI A ANGONDJE	02 avril 2024	PT/MRI Bureau du DNI
2	DISTRIBUTION DES ACCREDITATIONS FORMATION (BUREAU) VALIDATION DU REGLEMENT INTERIEUR PAR LE BUREAU	03 avril 2024	Bureau du DNI Secrétariat MRI
3	FORMATION DES BUREAUX DES COMMISSIONS ET SOUS COMMISSIONS	04 au 05 avril 2024	Secrétariat DNI
4	PLENIERE GENERALE MISE EN PLACE DES COMMISSIONS	06 avril 2024	Bureau du DNI
5	TRAVAUX EN COMMISSIONS ET SOUS COMMISSIONS	08 au 18 avril 2024	Présidents et Rapporteurs des commissions et sous commissions
6	ELABORATION ET VALIDATION DES RAPPORTS EN SOUS COMMISSION	19-21 avril 2024	Secrétariat du DNI
7	PLENIERE DES COMMISSIONS POUR LA VALIDATION DES RAPPORTS DES SOUS COMMISSIONS	22-23 avril 2024	Présidents des commissions Secrétariat du DNI Rapporteur Général
8	PLENIERE DU BUREAU DU DNI	24-25 avril 2024	Bureau du DNI
9	PLENIERE GENERALE DE PRESENTATION DU RAPPORT FINAL DU DNI	25-27 avril 2024	
10	CLOTURE DES ASSISES DU DNI	30 avril 2024	

RAPPORT DES 60 JOURS DE LA TASKFORCE

Libreville, le 15 Novembre 2023



N° _____/PT/CTRI/TF

Rapport des 60 jours de la Taskforce

1. Contexte

Depuis sa réactivation, la Taskforce pour le contrôle, l'audit et la vérification des dettes intérieures et extérieures, a démarré ses activités par la répartition de ses prérogatives en deux missions principales, notamment :

(i) La Finalisation des travaux des précédentes Taskforce

Il s'agira de contrôler les paiements effectués par le Trésor public, afin de déterminer la concordance avec les conventions qui avaient été élaborées par la Taskforce 2020/2021, d'une part, et reprendre, là où elles avaient été interrompues, les opérations sur la dette extérieure conduites par la Taskforce 2021/2022, d'autre part.

(ii) La vérification de la dette intérieure actuelle.

La Taskforce passera en revue le fichier correspondant, afin de s'assurer de son exhaustivité, de sa réalité, avec une tolérance zéro en cas de fraude, fausses déclarations, de surfacturations ou de rétro commissions.

Ce travail s'effectue à travers l'audition des autorités administratives et les sociétés concernées, l'examen des différentes pièces nécessaires, ainsi que les vérifications sur les différents sites avec les autres entités impliquées.

Les dossiers litigieux seront transmis aux autorités judiciaires assermentées, pour suite à donner. La présente mission constitue un challenge en vue participer à l'amélioration du climat des affaires dans notre pays, en assainissant les relations entre l'Etat et les entreprises.

C'est donc dans ce cadre que des opérations d'audits, de contrôles, de vérifications, de suivi des marchés et des projets seront menées afin d'en évaluer d'une part la valeur réelle de la dette intérieure et extérieure et du niveau de l'exécution des projets d'autre part et qui, en définitive constitueront un outil de prise de décision au profit des Hautes Autorités de la Transition.

A. Les travaux et activités menées

I. CONTROLE ET VERIFICATION DES TRAVAUX

I.1. Travaux de Génie Civil et Infrastructures

1. Travaux de construction du lycée Technique de Gamba, projet réalisé par l'entreprise SOWAF.

Il faut souligner que cette entreprise a signé avec le Conseil Départemental de NDOGOU un contrat de 6.019.718.251 FCFA TTC en 2013. Dans le cadre de cette opération l'entreprise a touché 5 milliards de FCFA pour un niveau de d'avancement de 15%. Ce qui nous a permis de constater que cette entreprise a été indûment payée dans le cadre de ce projet sans que les travaux ne soient suffisamment avancés.

Il faut également relever qu'en 2020, cette même entreprise a une fois de plus signé un contrat de 5.779.081.828 FCFA TTC avec le Ministère en charge de l'éducation en vue de l'achèvement du Lycée de Technique de GAMBIA.

Il faut notifier qu'une moins-value a été estimée à 2.165.709.146 FCFA HT soit 44.6 % du montant du contrat de l'entreprise hors taxes. Ce qui ramènera le montant de son contrat à 3.278.832.244 FCFA TTC au lieu de 5.779.081.828 FCA TTC.

Sur les faits l'entreprise a signé une reconnaissance sur l'honneur en s'engageant à achever les travaux du lycée de Gamba conformément au contrat.

La Taskforce a toutefois saisi le Procureur de la République aux regards des malversations constatées lors de la vérification de ce dossier.

2. Plan Complet de Relogement (PCR) des personnes affectées par le projet d'aménagement des Bassins Versants de Gué-Gué, Lowé-IAI et Terre Nouvelle financé par la BDEAC.

Pour rappel, en 2015, l'Etat Gabonais contracte un prêt auprès de la BDEAC d'un montant de quarante milliards (40 000 000 000) FCFA afin d'exécuter les travaux du Plan Complet de Réinstallation des personnes impactées par le projet d'aménagement des bassins versants de Gué-Gué, Lowé-IAI et Terre Nouvelle.

Ce projet devrait parvenir à construire de 1070 logements dans la zone de Bikélé Nzong.

Malheureusement, l'Unité de Coordination de l'Etude et des Travaux (UCET) du Ministère des TP, faute de mauvaise gestion avérée, de détournement de fonds et de manque de professionnalisme, n'est pas parvenue à atteindre cet objectif ; car seuls 250 bâtiments sont jusqu'ici en cours de construction depuis 2014.

Quant à SOBEA, nous avons notifiés des externalités négatives qui ont véritablement impactés les projets de PCR et Terre nouvelle.

- PCR : SOBEA - surfacturation sur les prix unitaires estimé à 1,5 milliards, paiement des prestations non réalisées en complicité avec la mission de contrôle CIRA MAJI et les équipes de L'UCET.
- Terre Nouvelle : SOBEA - Surfacturation de plus de 6 milliards de FCFA sur les prix unitaires (exemple, le prix des moustiquaires imprégnées est à 55.000 FCFA au lieu de 7.000 FCFA, le prix des blocs latéritiques rendus sur site est à 50.000 FCFA le mètre cube mais SOBEA facture à l'Etat 106.000 FCFA le mètre cube rendu sur site). Paiement des travaux non réalisés par l'entreprise toujours en accord avec la Mission de Contrôle CIRA MAJI et les équipes de L'UCET.

L'entreprise SOBEA a reconnu de surfacturation et c'est d'ailleurs pour cette raison que ce dernier a donné son accord pour réaliser à titre gracieux, des voiries sur Libreville sur un linéaire de 8,5 km.

3. Projet Renforcement de la Production d'Eau Potable du Grand Libreville par l'entreprise Orient Green Construction

Ce projet qui s'inscrit dans le cadre de la fourniture en eau potable du grand Libreville par l'Entreprise OGC, a permis de mettre en exergue :

- que l'entreprise n'a démontré aucune expérience dans ce type de travaux dans les années
- Qu'une entreprise ayant un capital de 2.000.000 FCFA, obtenu un marché de 16.745.314.708 FCFA.

Suite aux différentes vérifications de la Taskforce et après convocation de l'entreprise OGC, la Société OGC s'engage :

- Procéder à titre gracieux, à réaliser des travaux d'un (1) milliard de FCFA pour le compte de la SEEG.

4. Projet relatif au pavage des voiries prioritaires du Grand Libreville. Voies « Carrefour Rougier – Cimetière Igoumié long de 3,6 km, réalisé par l'entreprise COPRIM

- ✓ Montant total des lots : 6.107.718.562 FCFA TTC.
- ✓ Paiements reçus par COPRIM: 2.377.281.744 FCFA.

Suite à nos analyses et vérification, nous avons pu déceler :

- un trop perçu sur les quantités des travaux réalisés ;
- le non-respect des dispositions contractuelles ;

En définitive, l'entreprise après avoir ces faits, s'est engagée à :

- Accepte de faire les travaux supplémentaires de 600 ml jusqu'au Complexe IGOUmie à titre de compensation suite aux trop perçus.

5. Projet lié relatif au pavage des voiries prioritaires du Grand Libreville. Voie « Carrefour Rougier – Cimetière Igoumié long de 4 km ». Entreprise ZEINAB

- ✓ Montant total : 6.886.167.865 FCFA TTC.
- ✓ Paiements reçus par ZEINAB : 3.218.799.866 FCFA.

L'analyse de ce dossier a fait ressortir les dysfonctionnements suivants :

- Trop perçu sur les quantités des travaux réalisés ;

Suite à la visite de la Taskforce, l'entreprise reconnaît ces différentes irrégularités qui ont entraînées une surfacturation avérée des travaux de 1.532.974.311 FCFA.

La Taskforce a constaté également une négligence criarde de la part des agents du Ministère des Travaux Publics et de la mission de contrôle dans le suivi et le contrôle de ce projet.

A cet effet, l'entreprise ZEINAB s'est engagée à :

- l'entreprise sera payée à hauteur de la valeur de son contrat sans aucun dépassement de la valeur de son marché.

6. Travaux de réhabilitation des voiries des universités (UOB / USS) par l'entreprise GEFRA (Financement : PID-PIH / Rétrocession gaz).

- ✓ Montant du marché HT: 3 627 726 471 FCFA.
- ✓ Montant total reçu pour les deux opérations : 3 627 726 471 FCFA.

Montant total des travaux réellement exécutés selon l'entreprise : 1 820 511 170 FCFA.

La Société GFRA BTP a été payé à 100% pour un montant global 3 627 726 471 FCFA; contre 49% d'exécution des travaux.

Le Directeur Général de la Société GFRA BTP confirme avoir rétrocédé :

- Huit cent millions (800.000.000) de FCFA, comme retro-commission.

La société GFRA BTP doit également justifier l'utilisation d'un montant d'un milliard (1 000 000 000) de francs CFA dans le cadre de cette opération.

Au regard de toutes les irrégularités, la société s'est engagée à achever l'ensemble des travaux restants à ses frais sous peine des poursuites judiciaires.

7. Travaux d'aménagement des voiries de Mimongo, par l'entreprise SABA

- ✓ Montant du marché : 3 380 000 000 FCFA TTC.
- ✓ Paiements reçus par la SABA : 69 918 285 FCFA.
- ✓ Montant des travaux réalisés : 368 950 740 FCFA.
- ✓ Montant dû par la SABA à l'arrêt des travaux et le non-remboursement total de l'avance de démarrage : 500 000 000 FCFA.

La société reconnaît avoir reçu des paiements au-dessus du taux d'avancement physique des travaux dans le cadre de l'opération citée en objet.

SABA s'engage à réaliser les travaux à hauteur de cinq cent millions (500 000 000) de francs CFA.

8. Traitement du dossier des travaux de déforestation du site Movingui-Okolassi d'une surface de 50 hectares par l'entreprise Groupe CONCEPT

- ✓ montant total TTC : 1 071 000 000 FCFA.
- ✓ montant total perçus : 856 800 000 FCFA TTC.

Nous constatons, après vérification que le marché n'a pas été signé par la DGMP et le Ministre de l'économie et de la Relance. Devant cette irrégularité, ce marché ne doit pas faire l'objet d'exécution étant donné son illégalité.

Il faut observer de plus que :

- ✓ le coût réel de cette opération (50 hectares) est de 300 000 000 FCFA HT c'est-à-dire que le mètre/carré des travaux vaut 6 000 000 FCFA ;
- ✓ il ressort une surfacturation d'un montant global de 420 000 000 FCFA HT.

Suite aux différents constats faits dans le cadre de la mission de la Taskforce et des irrégularités observées, la Société Groupe Concept s'engage :

- ✓ à réaliser les travaux d'un montant de quatre cent vingt millions (420 000 000) de FCFA pour le compte de la Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC).

9. Travaux de construction des bâtiments et de clôture du lycée professionnel de l'Estuaire de Békélé (Lots N°2 et 3 sur 22 hectares) par l'entreprise CITP

- ✓ Montant réclamé par CITP à la base : 9 152 907 884 FCFA TTC.
- ✓ Montant total des paiements reçus par CITP : 8 297 046 558 FCFA
- ✓ Montant du trop-perçu par CITP : 50 857 880 FCFA.

Au cours de la mission de la Taskforce, il nous a été amené de constater ce qui suit :

- les locaux des transformateurs et le câblage sont achevés, il reste le branchement des cellules ;
- le montage de la clôture de l'établissement est en cours.

Après la vérification des paiements, la société CITP a eu un trop perçu de 50 857 880 francs CFA.

L'entreprise CITP s'est engagée, après audition, à réaliser les travaux en compensation de cette somme trop-perçue.

II. VERIFICATION DE LA DETTE

2.1. Recouvrements des créances

Dans le cadre des recouvrements des créances, la Taskforce a mené, en collaboration avec la Direction Générale des Impôts, une opération de recouvrement des créances dues au paiement des impôts.

C'est près de 20 milliards de F CFA qui ont été recouverts auprès des entreprises. Le tableau ci-dessous fait le point de la situation des entreprises créancières.

C'est près d'une quarantaine d'entreprise qui a fait l'objet d'audition auprès de la Taskforce.

Les engagements fiscaux restant à recouvrer sont évalués à hauteur de 46 010 979 438 de F CFA.

2.2 Comptes sous-séquestre

Sur près d'une cinquantaine de comptes bancaires des personnes physiques et morales, la Taskforce a pu recouvrer une Centaine de Milliards de F CFA.

III. CONTROLE DES INFRASTRUCTURES SEEG

D'après le travail effectué par la Taskforce, La Direction des Services Informatiques de la SEEG présente des failles majeures dans tous les domaines, notamment :

- Gouvernance
 - Aucune procédure normalisée
 - Il n'existe aucun parcours Client / Fournisseur permettant de respecter un process de façon obligatoire et est donc régulièrement contourné.
- Financier
 - Les factures de téléphonie sont supérieures à 500 Millions / An car il n'y a pas de politique d'optimisation et de contrôle (ni de contrat)
 - Sur le budget annuel DSI de la SEEG, il serait possible de faire une économie de 1 Milliard FCFA considéré ici comme surfacturation inutile.

IV. AUDITS INSTITUTIONNELS

4.1. Financement des projets et administration de la Direction Technique de l'ANPN

Constats :

- Faux et usages de faux et usurpation flagrante de titre de colonel et commandant ;
- Fausses déclarations de qualification et de compétence. Mauvaise gestion et utilisation frauduleuses des fonds liés au contentieux ;
- Utilisation abusive des fonds dans le fonctionnement ;
- Mauvaise gestion des opérations de surveillance ;
- Manque de professionnalisme dans la gestion des patrouilles ayant occasionnés mort d'hommes ;
- Risques d'affrontement des armées gabonaises et congolaises dans les situations de gestion de conflits.
- Détournement des objectifs dédiés aux fonds des projets.

- **Gestion des ressources techniques et financières des projets dédiés à l'ANPN**

La taskforce a rappelé au Directeur technique que son entité avait un flux financier important et dans ce cadre un point relatif aux engagements des finances d'être fait. Plus de dix (10) sources de financements pour l'ANPN dont notamment, USFISH, PERENCO, TOTAL, GSEZ, AIRTEL, CAFI, PMUG, GEFACHE, PROJET ELEPHANT, PROJET ARC EMERAUDE.

A cet effet, la Taskforce a rappelé que l'ANPN avait reçu plus de 85 milliards de FCFA au cours de ces dernières années et aucun projet concret d'infrastructures réalisé, la preuve

même les locaux de l'ANPN n'ont pas été construits. La preuve, plus de 90% de ces budgets sont dédiés au fonctionnement de l'ANPN.

C'est à ce titre que la Taskforce a recommandé la suspension des activités du directeur technique et de son adjoint.

V. APPUIS AUX DIFFERENTES INSTITUTIONS

5.1. Appui au Ministère en charge des travaux Publics

La Taskforce s'est fait l'honneur de recevoir Monsieur le Ministre en charge des Travaux Publics en vue d'échanger sur questions relatives à la contribution de la Taskforce dans le cadre du renforcement des capacités stratégique et opérationnelles dudit Ministère.

La Taskforce a recommandé à Monsieur le Ministre, la possibilité de réquisitionner certains opérateurs miniers et forestiers dans la réhabilitation de certaines routes du pays.

De plus, la Taskforce a également proposé la possibilité de mettre à la disposition des TP, les engins qui ont fait l'objet de saisie par l'Agence nationale des parcs nationaux lors des opérations de police forestières. A la seule condition que cette décision soit en référé directement par Monsieur le Procureur de la République.

5.2. Appui à l'administration des Impôts et des douanes

La Taskforce a collaboré avec les administrations des Douanes et celle des Impôts afin de faciliter le recouvrement des droits et taxes, des dettes fiscales de certaines entreprises exerçant dans divers activités. Cette initiative se poursuit avec l'ambition de parvenir à assainir renflouer les caisses de l'Etat avec comme alternatif de payer la dette intérieure normale.

VI. LES CARENCES OBSERVEES

- **Surfacturation dans la réalisation de plusieurs des marchés passés ;**
- **Non-respect des procédures des marchés publics ;**
- **Détournement des fonds des projets ;**
- **Budget de fonctionnement excessif et mauvaise utilisation des fonds ;**
- **Coordonnateurs de projets incompetents accumulant des fonctions administratives au sein des cabinets ministériels ;**
- **Aucune stratégie dans la programmation des remboursements des emprunts par les services du Trésor public et de la Direction Générale de la Dette.**

VII. LES RECOMMANDATIONS

Dans la perspective de garantir un avenir meilleur concernant la gestion des fonds alloués aux projets prioritaires, il faudra prendre des **mesures urgentes et fortes**, en mettant en place une politique radicale qui viserait à assainir les finances publiques mais aussi, à lutter contre l'enrichissement illicite et le détournement des fonds publics.

Un tableau synthèse récapitule les recommandations de la Taskforce.

Tableau synthèse


N°	Dossiers	Recommandations
1.	Rapport à mi-parcours des travaux de la taskforce sur les financements extérieurs ;	(i) Contrôle, suivi et évaluation des projets prioritaires Présidentiels
2.	Proposition de décret portant création de l'ordre des experts judiciaires du Gabon ;	(i) Donner au tribunal un avis qualifié sur une question précise (ii) Permettre le respect des droits de la défense ainsi que les délais fixés par le juge pour rendre leur rapport d'expertise
3.	Note relative à l'article 5 inhérente aux conventions dettes intérieures et extérieures ;	(i) Réalisation d'investissements par les entreprises de 50% de leurs avoirs au niveau national
4.	Note relative au recouvrement des fonds des entreprises au profit de l'Etat ;	(i) Mettre en place un suivi de comptes à recouvrer auprès des banques locales
5.	Fiche relative à la création du Parquet National Financier ;	(i) Mise en place d'une procédure de recouvrement des avoirs des criminels financiers sur le plan national et international (ii) Lutter contre la délinquance économique et financière
6.	Note relative à l'Agence Nationale de la Promotion des Investissements ;	(i) Amélioration du système d'identification des sièges des entreprises
7.	Note relative à l'amélioration de la procédure de passation des marchés publics ;	(i) Restriction des marchés aux entreprises pour un seuil de 500 000 000 Millions de F CFA (ii) Labélisation des entreprises des entreprises par spécialisation
8.	Note relative au visa d'opportunité.	(i) Mettre en place un visa d'opportunité pour tous les projets de plus de 6 milliards de F CFA


VIII. CONCLUSION

En définitive, dans la perspective de garantir un avenir meilleur concernant la gestion des fonds dédiés aux projets prioritaires, il est important de **prendre des mesures urgentes et fortes**, en mettant en place une **politique radicale** qui viserait à **assainir les finances publiques** mais également **lutter contre l'enrichissement illicite et les détournements des fonds publics**.



Annexes : Effets Taskforce à Libreville (routes Sotéga et la Peyrie)





MINISTRE DU PETROLE
SECRETARIAT GENERAL
DIRECTION GENERALE DES HYDROCARBURES
DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES ECONOMIQUES
JURIDIQUES ET FISCALES



Libreville, le 05 JAN. 2024

000050 /MP/SG/DGH/DAEJF



Le Directeur Général des Hydrocarbures

à

Monsieur le Directeur Général
Addax Petroleum Oil & Gas Gabon
BP: 452 Port Gentil

Refu le 9/1/2024

Objet : Votre relance sur la demande d'ouverture des négociations relatives au CEPP dinonga Irondu

Monsieur le Directeur Général,

Nous accusons réception de votre correspondance référencée n°Sinopec-Apogg-DG-01-24-003 du 4 janvier 2024, par laquelle vous nous réitérez votre désir d'ouvrir, dans les meilleurs délais, les négociations sur les champs de Tsiengui et d'Obangué dont les Autorisations Exclusives de Développement de Production expirent le 11 mars 2024.

En retour et faisant suite à notre correspondance référencée 00034/MP/SG/DGH/DAEJF du 5 janvier 2024, nous vous rappelons que les autorisations exclusives sus évoquées ont été établies et délivrées à votre société pour une durée de dix (10) ans non renouvelables. Au terme de cette période de 10 ans, les champs de Tsiengui et d'Obangué reviennent dans le domaine privé de l'Etat.

Eu égard à ce qui précède, nous vous demandons à nouveau de prendre toutes les dispositions nécessaires pour le retour dans le domaine privé de l'Etat de l'ensemble des champs régis par le CEPP « Dinonga Irondu n°G5-118 » au soir du 11 mars prochain.

Sachant compter sur votre collaboration habituelle,

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Directeur Général, l'expression de notre considération distinguée.

Ernest NDONG NGUEMA



Copie : Monsieur le Ministre



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